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I. INTRODUCTION
Scholarly interest in theories of interpretation has increased
dramatically over the last 15 to 20 years,1 resulting in myriad scholarly
publications.2 Interpretive theory is germane to almost all areas of the
law, including patent law, a subject in which I have a particular interest.
My interest, however, as reflected in this article is not in how courts
interpret the patent code, although that is a subject worthy of

1. This renascence is due largely to the schools of interpretation known as
textualism and pragmatism. The influence of textualism is a result of the advocacy of
some of its more prominent devotees;
see, e.g., ANTONIN S CALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRE T A T I O N : F EDERAL C OURTS AND THE LAW (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV . J.L. & P UB. P OL’ Y 59
(1988). The greatly increased role of pragmatism, or what some refer to as practical
reason, is largely attributable to several notable contemporary legal scholars and their
writings;
see, e.g., R ICHARD A. P OSNER, OVERC O M I N G LAW (1995), W ILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC S TA T U T O R Y I N T E R P R E T A T I O N (1994), R ICHARD R ORTY,
C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F P RAGMATISM (1982), Cornel West, T HE AMERICA N E V A S I O N
OF P HILOSOPHY (1989), Thomas C. Grey, What Good is Legal Pragmatism?, in
P RAGMATISM IN LAW AND S OCIETY 9 (Michael Brint & William Weaver, eds., 1991).
Of course, other interpretive theories have played a role as well, including
deconstructionism, semiotics, and post-modernism.
2. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, s u p r a note 1; Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without
Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60
OHIO S T. L.J. 1 (1999); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97
C O L U M . L. R E V . 673 (1997); Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory
Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. R EV. 585 (1996); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The
Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Inter pretation, 108 HARV . L. R EV. 593
(1995); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory
in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. R EV. 241 (1992); Peter C. Schanck,
Understanding Postmodern Thought and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation,
65 S. C AL. L. R EV. 2505 (1992); John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, Limitation of
Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
S TAN. L. R EV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989).
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exploration. Rather, my concern relates to what interpretive theories
courts, particularly the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, employ when interpreting patent claims.3
The relationship between theories of interpretation (e.g., statutory
or contract) and claim interpretation is important for at least three
reasons. First, some judges on the Federal Circuit have analogized
claim interpretation to statutory interpretation, while others have
compared it to interpreting a contract;4 and, therefore, studying theories
of interpretation can inform our understanding of how the court
interprets patent claims. Second, in the words of one of the founding
fathers of modern patent law, “the name of the game is the claim.”5
That is, the patent claim defines the proprietary boundaries of the
invention,6 and determining where exactly these boundaries reside is
often dispositive of such crucial issues as patent validity and
infringement.7 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the manner in

3. I use the word “interpretation” here to mean the process by which courts
discern the meaning of claim language.
Later in the article, I use “interpretation” to
mean the existence of a choice between or among competing constructions. See infra
text accompanying notes 280–89.
4. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985–87 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (discussing the similarities between statutory interpretation and claim
interpretation). In Markman, Judge Mayer asserted that patents are more analogous to
contracts. See id. at 997. Indeed, the statutory analogy is arguably misplaced. See,
e.g., John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place
of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpret ation, 47 UCLA L. R EV. 183, 210
(1999) (“[T]he reality is that patents are not statutes, but unique legal instruments that
are the product of a statute. An analysis that attended more closely to the needs of the
technological community would have treated patents as they are, rather than as poor
relations of more mainstream legal instruments.”).
5. Giles S. Rich, Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims — American
Perspectives, 21 INT’ L R EV. INDUS. P ROP. & C OPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990).
6. See 35 U.S.C. §112 (1994), ¶ 2 (requiring the patent applicant to include in h i s
application “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention”). See also Zenith Lab., Inc.
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“It is the claim that
sets the metes and bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent
system.”); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (“A claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which
the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using or selling the
protected invention.”).
7. See, e.g., Markman, 52 F.3d at 989 (Mayer, J.,concurring) (“[T]o decide what
the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case.”); Lucas Aeros pace, Ltd. v. Unison
Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 332 n.3 (D. Del. 1995) (“[C]laim construction more
often than not determines the outcome on infringement.”); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc.
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 859 (D. Del. 1995) (“Not surprisingly,
resolution of the claim interpretation issues often resolves the infringement issue, as it
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which the Federal Circuit interprets patent claims reflects the court’s
view of the proper scope of judicial power, which has implications for
patent law’s delicate incentive dynamic.
My goal in this article is to explore the proper scope of judicial
power in patent law by focusing on the Federal Circuit’s theories of
claim interpretation. Specifically, I examined the court’s claim
interpretation jurisprudence in an attempt to discern whether there is a
predominant interpretive school and whether this school is in accord
with the patent code and post-patent innovation practice or what can be
characterized as “improvement-theory” and “design-around theory.”8
These two theories are concerned with the incentives for persons of
ordinary skill in the art, namely competitors of the patent owner,9 to
improve upon or design around the patented technology.10 Closely
related to the relationship between interpretive theory and postinnovation practice are the proper roles of the doctrine of equivalents11
and optimal claim scope. Indeed, the interpretive tools used by a court
directly affect the extent of the patentee’s property interest, and,
therefore, where the patentee’s competitors may and may not tread.
Thus, claim interpretation theory lies at the heart of our patent system.

will in this case.”); MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (“[T]he dispositive issue on the merits would be the definition of the
invention.”); Linda Greenhouse, Ruling Curbs Jury’s Role on Patents, N.Y. T IMES, Apr.
24, 1996, at D1(“Once you have construed the scope of the claim, that’s the end of the
game.”) (quoting patent attorney, Bo Pasternack of Choate, Hall & Stewart).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 168–94.
9. See Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 952 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(reasoning that a competitor of a patentee is analytically equivalent to the person of
ordinary skill in the art).
10. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of patent law’s disclosure
requirements, which are contained in the first two paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
Section 112 requires a patent applicant to set forth his invention so as to enable other
artisans to make and use the claimed invention. A principal function of the disclosure
requirements is to provide other artisans in the technical field with information that
enlarges the storehouse of knowledge, and therefore spur these artisans to improve upon
or design around the claimed invention — thus leading to further technological progress.
11. The doctrine of equivalents (“DOE”) permits courts to find infringement when
an accused infringing device is an “equivalent” to that claimed in the patent. This
doctrine understands that a strict and literal adherence to the written claim in
determining scope of protection can invite unfair subversion of a valuable right, which
would substantially diminish the economic value of patents. As the Supreme Court
noted, “courts have also recognized that to permit imitation of a patented invention
which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the
patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). See infra text accompanying notes 295–3 0 9 .
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A study of the Federal Circuit’s claim interpretation jurisprudence
reveals two schools of interpretation. I characterize these approaches
as (1) hypertextualism,12 which is the predominant interpretative theory;
and (2) pragmatic textualism,13 which is gradually asserting itself. The
hypertextualist judge has an expansive view of judicial power,
characterizing claim interpretation as a question of law subject to de
novo review. This highly formalistic approach stresses textual fidelity
and internal textual coherence, 14 but eschews extrinsic evidence as an
interpretive tool, portraying its use as “rarely, if ever,” proper.15
Although hypertextualism posits that expert testimony may be used if
the intrinsic record16 is ambiguous, a hypertextualist judge rarely finds
ambiguity. If ambiguity is found, expert testimony may be used to

12. I am not the first to use the term “hypertextualism” in the context of
interpretive theory.
S e e , e . g . , 2 B RUCE ACKERMAN, W E T H E P E O P L E :
T RANSFORMATIONS 72 (1998); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative
State, 95 COLUM. L. R EV. 749 (1995).
13. I should note at this point that I am well aware of the many criticisms of
textualism as a “plain meaning” or “four corners” approach to interpretation. See in f r a
note 197. Although this criticism may arguably prove to be true of textualism as
applied in practice, I adopt in this article a form of textualism that, while faithful to the
text, understands the importance of extrinsic context in discerning meaning. See infra
text accompanying notes 195–234.
To a large extent, my theory of “pragmatic
textualism” has been influenced by the philosophy of pragmatism and the interpretive
school of thought known as textualism as set forth by Judges Richard Posner and Frank
Easterbrook, respectively. Judge Posner, building upon the rich history of pragmatism
dating back to John Dewey and William James, has stres sed the need for pragmatism as
an “antidote for formalism” and the connectedness between knowledge and empiricism.
See generally, P OSNER, supra note 1.
See also, JOHN DEWEY, T HE QUEST FOR
C ERTAINTY (Capricorn Books 1960) (1929); W I LLIAM JAMES, P RAGMATISM (World
Publishing Co. 1961). I am receptive to the textualist philosophy of Judge Easterbrook
because his view of textualism emphasizes the importance of linguistic conventions and
social practices to discerning meaning. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History,
and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 1 7 HARV . J.L. & P UB. P OL’ Y 61, 61 (1994)
(“Words take their meaning from contexts, of which there are many — other words,
social and linguistic conventions, the problems the authors were addressing.”).
14. Judge Richard Posner would refer to this type of approach as “bottom-up
reasoning,” whereby one engages in “interpretation according to ‘plain meaning’” and
“starts with the words of the statute or other enactment, or with a case or mass of cases,
and moves from there — but one doesn’t move far.” POSNER, supra note 1, at 172.
15. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
16. The intrinsic record in claim interpretation includes the (1) patent claims; (2)
a detailed explanation of the invention known as the specification, or more accurately,
the written description; and (3) the prosecution history, which is a written record of the
proceeding before the Patent and Trademark Office between a patent applicant and a
patent examiner.
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educate the judge in the relevant technology — not for the purpose of
interpreting the ambiguous claim language. 17
On the other hand, the pragmatic textualist approach, while
embracing the importance of textual fidelity and internal coherence, also
emphasizes the relevance of extrinsic context and industry custom, of
which patent law’s “person having ordinary skill in the art”
(“PHOSITA”) 18 is representative. This hypothetical artisan is one of the
cynosures of our patent system and is valued by the pragmatic textualist
as an interpretive tool because the artisan has knowledge of the
underlying assumptions present in his technological community and is
sensitive to the facts on the ground.19 Indeed, patents are written by
and for persons having ordinary skill in the art,20 and to limit claim
construction to the intrinsic record is, for the pragmatic textualist, a
legal fiction largely detached from what Arthur Corbin referred to as the
“undisputed contexts.”21 Because the meaning of a word cannot be
“divorced from the circumstances in which it is used,”22 a pragmatic

17. See, e.g., EMI Group N.A., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“The Federal Circuit has admonished that claims should preferably be interpreted
without recourse to extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony, other than perhaps
dictionaries or reference books, and that expert testimony should be received only for
the purpose of educating the judge. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 983. . . . In Cybor Corp.
v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454, the court reaffirmed that extrinsic evidence
including expert testimony is not to be relied upon for purposes of claim interpretation,
other than to aid the judge in understanding the technology; such evidence is only ‘an
aid to the court in coming to a correct conclusion as to the true meaning of the language
employed in the patent.’”).
18. See Cyril A. Soans, Some Absurd Presumptions in Patent Cases, 10 IDEA 433,
438 (1966) (referring to patent law’s person having ordinary skill in the art by the
acronym “Mr. Phosita”).
19. See In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The person of
ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to know the relevant
prior art.”); Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (“The person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed
to be aware of all the pertinent prior art.”).
20. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc. , 138 F.3d 1448, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (Newman, J., additional views); Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc.,
34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Claims speak to those skilled in the art.”). See
also 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112 (1994).
21. Walter Benn Michaels, Against Formalism: The Autonomous Text in Legal and
Literary Interpretation, 1 P OETICS T ODAY 23, 27 (1979); see also Donald H. J.
Hermann, Phenomenology, Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Legal Study: Applications
of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L. R E V. 379,
407–09 (1982); Martin F. Katz, After the Deconstruction: Law in the Age of
Post-Structuralism, 24 U.W. ONTARIO L. R EV. 51, 56 (1986).
22. E. ALLAN F ARNSWORTH, C ONTRACTS § 7.10, at 512 (2d ed. 1990).
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textualist approach would consider extrinsic evidence without a
threshold determination of intrinsic ambiguity.23
Any interpretive approach must take into consideration the interplay
between patent law’s disclosure requirements, ex post innovation
practices, and technology’s evolutional nature. One can argue that an
interpretive theory that downplays the importance of the text or
excessively relies on extrinsic context may effectively weaken the role
of the patent claim as guidepost and may be detrimental to future
innovation. Competitors of the patent owner may channel their
inventive energies elsewhere rather than design around a patent claim
having seemingly migratory borders. An aggressive search for the
underlying purpose of the invention or immoderate reliance on expert
testimony also raises concerns of separation of powers as they permit
a judge to stray too far from the text, leading him into the Article II
province of the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).
However, an interpretive theory, such as hypertextualism, that
places too much emphasis on text is not without its problems. First, a
legitimate theory of claim interpretation should embrace the technologic
context and industry custom of which the claimed invention is a part.24
By characterizing claim interpretation as a question of law devoid of
fact-finding and neglecting extrinsic context as an interpretive tool, the
hypertextualist judge verges on abstraction and denies that language,
particularly technical language, is, as Wittgenstein taught us, a “social
enterprise” whose meaning is largely dependent on its context.25 Thus,

Importantly, from the pragmatic
23. See infra text accompanying notes 92–98.
textualist perspective, use of the artisan as an interpretive tool in patent law is quite
different than the use of legislative history in the context of statutory interpretation
because, unlike legislative history, the artisan is explicitly part of the patent statute s(ee
35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112), which, of course, was passed by both houses of Congress and
presented to the President. In the context of statutory interpretation, one of the
principal objections of textualists, and, I would argue, pragmatic textualists, to the use
of legislative history is that the statements of committee members and individual
legislators are not law. These statements do not go through the constitutionally required
process of passing both houses of Congress by a majority vote and presentment to the
President pursuant to Article I, § 7. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. R EV. 621 (1990) (discussing objections to the use of legislative history);
Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 C HI.-KENT L. R E V .
441 (1990).
24. Although the Federal Circuit frequently states that it interprets claims in the
context of the patent, what the court actually means by “context” is the patent’s
intrinsic record (i.e., the claims, written description, including any drawings, and the
prosecution history), not extra-textual sources. See, e.g., Pall Corp. v. Hemasure, Inc.,
181 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
25. See infra note 228.
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hypertextualism ignores the insights of contemporary legal and
hermeneutic philosophy,26 and, as importantly, disregards the centrality
of patent law’s artisan.27 Ignoring the role of the artisan is particularly
problematic given the fact that innovation in “complex technologies is
the work of organizational networks” and these “[n]etworks have
proven especially capable of incorporating tacit knowledge into their
learning processes.”28 The hypertextualist divorces himself from these
ramified networks by refusing to delve into their linguistic practices.
This has significant implications for ex post innovation and the
adjudication of claim scope. As the hypertextualist dismisses the very
tools that enable one to discern accurately not only the patentee’s
inventive contribution to society, but also the contribution of the
patentee’s competitors, the separation between industry and court
widens. Although researchers will no doubt continue to pursue their
agendas, the question becomes at what costs in terms of wasteful rentseeking behavior and unnecessary litigation?
Second, there are constitutional concerns with hypertextualism in
that strict adherence to the patent’s text ironically leads to a breakdown
in separation of powers.29 The patent code explicitly empowers the
PTO to examine patent applications 30 and gauge patentability through the
eyes of the artisan skilled in the relevant technology.31 The examiner,
during the examination process, places himself in the shoes of a

26. See infra text accompanying notes 203–234.
27. Indeed, it is a basic tenet of patent law that claims are to be construed through
the eyes of the artisan. See, e. g . , 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112; see also In re Cortright, 165
F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Although the PTO must give claims their broadest
reasonable interpretation, this interpretation must be consistent with the one that those
skilled in the art would reach.”); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d
1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the
invention through whose eyes the claims are construed.”); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v.
BP Chems., Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A technical term used in a
patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons
experienced in the field of the invention”).
28. Robert W. Rycroft & Don E. Kash, Innovation Policy for Complex
Technologies, ISSUES IN S CI . & T ECH . 73, 73–74 (Fall 1999) [hereinaft er Rycroft &
Kash, Innovation Policy]. Rycroft and Nash write that this tacit knowledge includes
“unwritten know-how that often can be understood only with experience.” Id. at 7 4 .
See also R OBERT W. R YCROFT & DON E. KASH , T HE C OMPLE X I T Y C HALLENGE:
T E C H N O L O G I C A L I NNOVATION FOR THE 21 ST C E N T U R Y (1999) [hereinafter
R YCROFT & KASH , T HE C OMPLEXITY C HALLENGE].
29. See U.S. C ONST . arts. I–III.
30. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1994).
31. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112 (1994).

No. 1]

Claim Interpretation Theory

9

PHOSITA. 32 The patent examiner is, to a large extent, part of the
technological community to which the invention, the inventor, and the
inventor’s competitors belong. The patentability provisions of the
patent code also apply to Article III courts, including the Federal
Circuit.33 By refusing to consider the artisan’s perspective, the Federal
Circuit assigns meaning to a claim term without employing the
Congressionally mandated analytical framework set forth in Title 35.
The irony is that although one would think that strict adherence to the
patent’s text would limit the exercise of judicial discretion, the judge, by
turning a deaf ear to the skilled artisan, replaces the artisan and discerns
claim meaning by examining the intrinsic record through her own eyes.
Lastly, the hypertextualists, in the name of certainty and uniformity,
review claim interpretation de novo “without deference to the trial
court’s judgment.”34
De novo review and the concomitant
diminishment of the roles of the district court and extrinsic context
were a natural outgrowth of the characterization of claim interpretation
as a question of law. Although certainty is a laudable goal, there is a
temporal dimension to the realization of certainty. Obviously, the earlier
certainty is achieved in the litigation or business-planning process the
better; yet, de novo review at the Federal Circuit level leads to dilatory
certainty in claim meaning.35 Furthermore, hypertextualism ignores the
district court’s superior institutional position with respect to extrinsic
evidence. Once certainty is realized at the Federal Circuit level, that
does not necessarily mean that the claim was properly interpreted.
Indeed, by excluding the use of extrinsic context, the odds of reaching
an incorrect interpretation are greatly enhanced. Upon a closer analysis,

32. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he PTO applies
to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in
their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art . .
.”); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“It is axiomatic . . . that claim
language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of
ordinary skill in the art.” (quoting In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).
See also MANUAL OF P ATENT E X A M I N I N G P ROCEDURE § 2111.01 (7th ed. July
1998).
33. Of course, because an issued patent is presumed valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282
(1994), the Federal Circuit will focus on validity, not patentability. Nevertheless, the
same code provisions applied by the PTO during prosecution of the patent are also
applied by Federal Circuit in a litigation context.
34. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
1999). See also Pall Corp. v. Hemasure Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“[We review construction of the claims] without deference to the rulings of the trial
court.”).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 149–54.
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it is difficult to understand why, in the context of claim interpretation,
de novo review is needed to promote uniformity and certainty. That is,
regardless of the standard of review it employs, uniformity and
certainty are achieved when the Federal Circuit exercises its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over patent issues,36 and when the district court,
in appropriate circumstances, invokes the doctrine of issue preclusion.37
In the end, hypertextualism’s labeling of claim interpretation as a
question of law is largely artificial — a fiction that exacerbates the
already difficult task of claim interpretation for the district court judge.
This article, therefore, is skeptical of hypertextualism as a theory
of claim interpretation and argues that it ultimately cannot deliver on its
promise of greater certainty and uniformity. As such, while both
interpretive schools have as their lodestar the realization of certainty and
uniformity, I argue that pragmatic textualism is the interpretive
approach that can best realize these ends.38 To a large extent, Judges
Rader, Newman, and Mayer are pragmatic textualists. Their opinions
concerning claim interpretation demonstrate that they, “like other users
of language, want to know its context, including assumptions shared by
the speakers and the intended audience.”39 Of course, the meaning that
is ultimately given to the technical term must be consonant with the
patent’s text. This emphasis on textual internal coherence is central to
pragmatic textualism,40 and the hypertextualists have correctly made this
an essential part of their philosophy. However, “[t]extualism [certainly

36. See infra text accompanying notes 316–24.
37. See, e.g., TM Patents, L.P. v. Int’l Bus. Machs., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). The only situation that I can think of where de novo review is needed
to promote uniformity is when issue preclusion is unavailable to the district court judge
— for instance, when the patentee seeks to enforce a claim construction from a
previous litigation on a defendant who was not part of that litigation. See infra text
accompanying notes 310–38.
38. For an excellent discussion and analysis of the virtues of the text of a patent,
particularly the claim itself, as an interpretive tool in claim interpretation, see Thomas,
supra note 4.
39. Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 443.
40. As Judge Rader noted in Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d
1298 (Fed. Cir. 1999), it is good counsel to “urge[] trial judges to focus on the patent
document — notably the claims themselves — to ascertain the scope of patent
coverage.” Id. at 1314. See also Thermalloy, Inc. v. Aavid Eng’g, Inc., 121 F.3d 691,
693 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, J.) (“[T]hroughout the interpretation process, the focus
remains on the meaning of claim language.”); Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation — in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI . L. R EV. 800, 808
(1983) (asserting that in the context of statutory interpretation “words of a statute are
always relevant, often decisive, and usually the most important evidence of what the
statute was meant to accomplish”).
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pragmatic textualism] is not literalism,”41 and, unlike hypertextualism,
which cabins itself within the four corners of the patent text, the
pragmatic textualist is an instrumentalist who understands that “the
meaning of a word is its use in the language.”42 As Judge Easterbrook
notes, “[m]eaning comes from the ring the words would have had to a
skilled user of words . . . thinking about the same problem.”43
In addition, the pragmatic textualists on the Federal Circuit are
motivated by process considerations such as institutional competence. 44
The question for them is not whether expert testimony is a question of
law or fact; rather, having concluded that expert testimony (or other
forms of extrinsic evidence) is useful and desirable when construing
claim language, the pragmatic textualist asks: Is the trial judge or
appellate judge better able to understand and incorporate expert
testimony into the interpretive process? The pragmatic textualist
appellate judge, well aware of his institutional limitations, opts for the
former and would allow for a more deferential approach towards the
district court’s claim construction.
Pragmatic textualism strikes me as a judicious approach to claim
interpretation. A judge who subscribes to this approach is grounded,
self-aware, and empirically inclined.45 She has faith in the patent’s text,
but understands that the legitimacy of her faith depends upon her
understanding of the technologic world around her, both in terms of

See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Pla i n
41. M anning, supra note 2, at 696.
Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV .
J.L. & P UB. P OL’ Y 401, 407 (1994) (asserting that textualism embraces a “broad
linguistic and cultural context”);
Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical
Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. R EV . 1717, 1751 (1995) (“Text
comes first, not because it ‘speaks for itself,’ but because it is the touchstone.”)
42. LUDWIG W ITTGENSTEIN, P HILOSOPHICAL INV E S T I G A T I O N S § 43 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 19 5 8 ) .
See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, J.) (“As a general rule, the
construing court interprets words in a claim as one of skill in the art at the time of
invention would understand them. ”); Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d
1211, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“Claim interpretation demands an
objective inquiry into how one of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of the
invention would comprehend the disputed word or phrase in view of the patent claims,
specification, and prosecution history.”).
43. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV . J.L. & P UB. P OL’ Y 59, 61 (1988). See also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (asserting that the
meaning of terms in statutes should be determined by the meaning that is “most in
accord with context and ordinary usage.”).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 280–86.
45. See P OSNER, supra note 1, at 4–21 (discussing what a pragmatist values).
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discerning claim meaning and, once discerned, the effect the meaning
will have on the technological community to whic h the invention
belongs.46
Part II of this article focuses on the origins of hypertextualism, its
culmination in the Federal Circuit, and the events that gave rise to the
current ideological struggle between the hypertextualists and the
pragmatic textualists. It also discusses the potential adverse effect of
hypertextualism on patent law’s ex post incentives, namely improvement
theory and design-around theory. Part III explores the importance of
extrinsic context and underlying assumptions to a claim interpretation
analysis. I also discuss the centrality of the hypothetical artisan to the
patent system, as well as the artisan’s role as representative of industry
custom and culture. Part III also explores the relevance to claim
interpretation of process and functional considerations such as
institutional competence, early certainty, and issue preclusion. Lastly,
I address how a judge should confront persistent ambiguity by exploring
the application of canons of claim interpretation as default rules.

II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ’S HYPERTEXTUALISM
A. The Markman Revolution and the Beginning of
Hypertextualism
1. Markman I: PHOSITA Blinded
Many Federal Circuit judges in recent years have understandably
expressed their frustration with inept or purposively vague claim
drafting,47 the uncertainties that accompany the equitable doctrine of

46. See Thomas C. Grey, What Good Is Legal Pragmatis m?, in P RAGMATISM IN
LAW AND S OCIETY 9, 15 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) (“We
pragmatists keep in the back of our minds the reminder that we are thinking to some
end — thinking instrumentally. We also keep there a reminder that we are thinking
against a background of tacit presupposition of which we can never be fully aware —
thinking contextually.”) (emphasis in original).
Although the emphasis on
instrumentalism is consistent with the traditional utilitarian justification of the
American intellectual property regime, it would be incorrect to equate pragmatism with
the ulitilitarianism of Bentham.
As Thomas Cotter notes, “A pragmatist may be
interested not only in the substantive consequences of a given rule, but also in its
systematic and expressive consequences.”
Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics,
and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. R EV. 1, 29 n.153 (1997); see also Thomas F. Cotter,
Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2085,
nn.55–56, 2091–95 & 2135 (1996).
47. See, e.g., ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1583 (Fed.
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equivalents,48 and the vicissitudes of the jury in patent cases.49 Similar
to the atmosphere in the late nineteenth century,50 this frustration

Cir. 1988) (Nichols, J., dissenting) (stating that with reference to claim drafting, “[w]e
are up against what we must realistically consider a growing inability of speakers and
writers, lawyers, technicians, and laymen, to say what they intend to say with accuracy
and clarity.”).
48. See, e.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (Lourie, J.) (“Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception,
however, not the rule, for if the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of
patent claims can never be relied on, and that the doctrine of equivalents is simply the
second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend protection
beyond the scope of the claims, then claims will cease to serve their intended purpose.
Competitors will never know whether their actions infringe a granted patent.”).
49. See, e.g., Judge Paul R. Michel, Improving Patent Jury Trials, 532 PLI/Pat 77,
81 (1998) (“The very unpredictability of jury verdicts not only undermines opinion
letters, but discourages license agreements and design-arounds, and multiplies litigation
— with attendant costs in money, disruption and delay.”).
50. In the early nineteenth century, there was no statutory requirement to claim
an invention. The Patent Act of 1793 simply required the applicant to “distinguish [his
invention] from all other things before known.” Patent Act of 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. 318,
321 (repealed 1836).
Despite the lack of a statutory claim requirement, applicants
began to include claim-type language in their patents.
These inchoate claims were
eventually used with greater frequency. Applicants would engage in what was known as
central claim drafting, whereby an applicant would describe his invention in a claim and
thereafter include the phrase “as substantially as described herein” or some variation
thereof.
During litigation, the court would peruse the written description and the
drawings to determine the “principle that formed the inventive idea or solution
underlying the claim language.”
Toshiko Takenaka, Doctrine of Equivalents After
Hitlon-Davis: A Comparative Law Analysis, 22 R UTGERS C OMPUTE R & T ECH . L.J.
479, 502 (1996). This practice was so common that when the Patent Act of 1836 was
passed, it was “understood as merely codifying the existing law which had been
developed by the courts.” Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. P a t e n t s , 20 J.
P AT. & T RADEMARK OFF. S OC’ Y 134, 143 (1938). The word “claim” found its way
into the 1836 Patent Act, and as a result, assumed greater importance. Nevertheless, the
claim was still not regarded as the central feature of the patent document even though
applicants began to draft claims more specifically by expending a “great deal of effort
. . . in formulating claims, and the practice grew of presenting a profusion of claims of
varying form and scope.” William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in
Patent Claims, 46 MICH . L. R EV. 755, 764 (1948). As the emphasis on claims grew,
however, so did the ease with which a competitor could circumvent claims by making
minor modifications to his product, thus avoiding literal infringement. The Supreme
Court responded to this practice in Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1 How. 1853),
wherein the Court held that a device may infringe a patent claim despite the fact that
the claim did not literally read on the device. Thus, the Court looked beyond the four
corners of the patent claim and established what became known as the doctrine of
equivalents. Many viewed Winans and its progeny as a threat to the notice function of
the patent claim, and in 1870 Congress, for the first time, specifically required the
patent applicant to claim his invention distinctly and with particularity.
This new
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prompted some judges to reemphasize the importance of certainty,
uniformity, and predictability in patent law; one way to establish this
virtuous triumvirate is to champion, as the hypertextualists have done,
the notice function of the patent claim.51 Given that 35 U.S.C. § 112
requires the patentee to “particularly” point out and “distinctly” claim
what he “regards as his invention,” competitors of the patentee should
be able to discern the boundaries of the patentee’s proprietary interest
without lifting their eyes from the patent’s text.52
As we will see, the hypertextualist “movement” ineluctably led to
the elimination of the jury from the issue of claim interpretation, a
development generally regarded as positive by the patent bar.53

requirement, which came to be known as peripheral claiming, was designed to
“accommodate the notice function of claims.” Joseph S. Cianfrani, An Economic
Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & T ECH . 1, 13 (1997).
It
accomplished this by increasing the reliability “on claims by the public by limiting the
bounds of the patent to that covered by the claims and a narrow range of equivalents.”
Id. at 14. Central claiming was officially dead, and much like the hypertextualist’s
atmosphere today, the patent claim in 1870 held center stage. See, e.g., Merrill v
Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (asserting that the claim is of “primary importance”
in ascertaining exactly what is patented).
51. See, e.g., Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1311 (Michel, J.) (referring to notice
function of claims); Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817, 830
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (Lourie, J.) (referring to notice function of claims).
52. See, e.g., Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472, 1474 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting from the Order declining the suggestion for rehearing
in banc) (“Public notice of the scope of the right to exclude, as provided by the patent
claims, specification and prosecution history, is a critical function of the entire scheme
of patent law. The notice function is critical because it provides competitors with the
necessary information upon which they can rely to shape their behavior in the
marketplace.”); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F.3d 948, 951, (Fed. Cir.1993) (stating
function of claims is “putting competitors on notice of the scope of the claimed
invention”); Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573–74 (1876) (“It seems to us that nothing can be
more just and fair, both to the patentee and to the public, than that the former should
understand, and correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for what he claims a
patent.”).
53. See ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, Resolutions Acted Upon by
Council: August 1995-1996, 1996 ABA S EC. INTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY LAW R EP .
19 (containing text of Resolution 605-1, which the Council approved in October of
1995):
RESOLVED, that the Section of Intellectual Property Law
reaffirms in principle that construing patent claims to define the
scope of the patent right is a question of law that is treated, by
both the trial and appellate courts, identical to statutory
construction, and specifically, the Section recommends that the
ABA file an amicus brief on the merits in the United States
Supreme Court in support of the Respondent in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc.
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However, reducing the jury’s role in patent litigation was only the first
step. In what ultimately justifies the label “hypertextualism,” the court
characterized claim interpretation as a question of law subject to de
novo review, thus rendering the patent’s text the principal, and for all
practical purposes, the sole interpretive tool — a tool that, according to
the hypertextualists, is rarely ambiguous. As such, in the name of
certainty, uniformity, and predictability, the respective roles of the trial
judge and the expert witness have been greatly marginalized, while the
influence of the Federal Circuit, in turn, has been significantly
augmented.
The importance of the notice function of the patent claim has
always been appreciated, or at least understood by judges on the Federal
Circuit and its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
However, it was not until the 1995 en banc Federal Circuit decision in

See also ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, 1996 Fall Council Meeting, 1996
ABA S EC. INTELLECTUAL P RO P E R T Y LAW R EP . 19 (“[T]he vote [of the Amicus
Briefs Committee] was 19-3 to support the Respondent over the Petitioner.”); Joseph
R. Re, Understanding Both Markman Decisions, 456 PLI/PAT 77, 92 (1996) (“The
patent bar apprehensively read the [Supreme Court’s Markman] decision and breathed
a sigh of relief.”); Arthur Wineburg, What Hath Markman Wrought?, IP W ORLDWIDE,
Sept. / Oct. 1996, at 1, 4 (“This decision will greatly increase the predictability and
uniformity of interpretations of patent claims .”); Richard A. Machonkin, Note:
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co.: The Federal Circuit Gets Its Laws and Its Facts Straight, 9 HARV . J.L.
& T ECH . 181, 203 (1996) (“Both Markman and Hilton Davis properly allocate the
burdens of adjudication between judge and jury.”); William R. Zimmerman, Note:
Unifying Markman and Warner-Jenkinson: A Revised Approach to the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 11 HARV . J.L. & T ECH . 185, 267 (“ Markman . . . developed a uniform
and consistent inquiry for assessing literal infringement.”); Federal Circuit Holds
Fourteenth Annual Judicial Conference, BNA P AT., T RADEMARK & C OPYRIGHT L.
DAILY, July 5, 1996, at D3 (“[Practitioner Lawrence] Pretty speculated that
[Markman] will result in more predictability where claim construction is involved[,] .
. . spur early motions for summary judgment and . . . more settlements in patent cases[,
and] . . . a swinging of the pendulum back to more court trials and away from jury
tri als.”); Holmes J. Hawkins III, Claim Interpretation in a Post-Markman Environment,
572 PLI/P AT 681, 709 (1999) (“One of the most important legacies of the Markman
decision is that parties now have the ability to identify and resolve claim interpretation
issues at a much earlier stage than before.”). But see Donald R. Dunner & Howard A.
Kwon, Cybor Corp v. FAS Technologies : The Final Say on Appellate Review of Claim
Construction?, 80 J. P AT. & T RADEMARK OFF. S OC’ Y 481, 497 (1998) (“The Federal
Circuit’s plenary authority over the claim construction process may have harsh results
in practice and may undermine the juridical role of the district courts in patent
litigation.”); William F. Lee, The Ever Confounding Question of Claim Construction:
Markman and Its Progeny, 531 PLI/PAT 151, 153 (1998) (“ [The] impact [of
Markman], unfortunately, has not necessarily been that desired or expected.”).
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Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 54 (Markman I) that it reached
the forefront of patent law jurisprudence. Prior to Markman I’s arrival
at the doors of the Federal Circuit, the court was well aware of the
concerns of the patent bar regarding the susceptibility and credulity of
juries in patent cases, particularly with respect to the issue of claim
interpretation.55 Markman I provided the court with an opportunity to
address these concerns.
The principal issue in Markman I seemingly boiled down to one of
institutional competence: who is better able to interpret patent claims —
judge or jury?56 In finding that the judge was best suited to interpret
patent claims, the Federal Circuit provided several functional reasons.
For instance, the court focused on tradition,57 gravity of the decision,58
predictability,59 and uniformity.60 This part of the court’s analysis was

54. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
55. See, e.g., Michael A. Sar t o r i , An Economic Incentives Analysis of the Jury’s
Role in Patent Litigation, 79 J. P A T . & T RADEMARK OFF. S OC’ Y, 331, 333 (1997)
(“[I]n time with the questioning by the patent legal community, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit entered the foray and questioned the jury's role in three areas of
patent litigation,” including claim interpretation.).
56. There were also constitutional issues pertaining to the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury that are beyond the scope of this article and not particularly germane to
my thesis.
57. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 978 (asserting that a patent is a written instrument
and “[i]t has long been and continues to be a fundamental principle of American
[patent] law that ‘the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the
court.’”).
58. See id. (“When a court construes the claims of the patent, it ‘is as if the
construction fixed by the court had been incorporated in the specification,’ and in this
way the court is defining the federal legal rights created by the patent document.”)
( q u o t i n g GEORGE T. C URTIS, A T REATISE ON THE LAW OF P ATENTS FOR USEF U L
INVENTIONS § 452, at 609 (4th ed. 1873)).
59. See id. at 978–79 (“[I]t is only fair (and statutorily required) that competitors
be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude
. . . . They may understand what is the scope of the patent owner’s rights by obtaining
the patent and prosecution history — ‘the undisputed public record’ — and applying
established rules of construction to the language of the patent claim in the context of
the patent.
Moreover, competitors should be able to rest assured, if infringement
litigation occurs, that a judge, trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the
patent and its associated public record and apply the established rules of construction,
and in that way arrive at the true and consistent scope of the patent owner’s rights to
be given legal effect.”) (quoting Senmed, Inc. v. Richard Allan Med. Indus., 888 F.2d
815, 819 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
60. See id. at 979 (“To treat the nature of the patented invention as a matter of
fact, to be inquired of and determined by a jury, would at once deprive the inventor of
the opportunity to obtain a permanent and universal definition of his rights under the
patent.”) (quoting W ILLIAM C . R O B I N S O N , T H E L AW OF P ATENTS FOR USEFUL
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well-reasoned, and the opinion should have ended there. However,
perhaps inclined to establish itself as the arbiter of claim meaning and
to enhance its power to oversee patent infringement disputes, the court
went on to find that claim interpretation is a question of law subject to
de novo review:61
We . . . hold that in a case tried to a jury, the court
has the power and obligation to construe as a matter
of law the meaning of language used in the patent
claim . . . . Because claim construction is a matter of
law, the construction given the claims is reviewed de
novo on appeal. 62
It is important to point out that the court did not have to reach (or
create) the law/fact issue to find that a judge is better able than a jury
to interpret claims.63 It could very easily have justified its decision on
the functional or institutional considerations that it articulated.
Moreover, by addressing the law/fact issue, the court painted itself
into a corner with respect to the issue of extrinsic evidence because it
was now faced with the prospect of reconciling the use of factually
intensive expert testimony by district court judges with its holding that
claim interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. The
court finessed this issue by focusing on the informational aspects of
expert testimony. According to the court, because a district court judge
may not be technologically savvy, “[e]xtrinsic evidence . . . may be
necessary to inform the court about the language in which the patent is

INVENTIONS § 733, at 483 (1890)).
61. In her dissent, Judge Newman characterized this as “classification power.”
Citing the work of Professor Martin Louis, Judge Newman cautioned that
“[c]ommentators have remarked on the temptation of appellate courts to redefine
questions of fact as questions of law in order to impose the court’s policy viewpoint on
the decision.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 1008. See also Thomas, supra note 4, at 209–10
(“Seeking to expand its ability to regulate patent infringement disputes, the Federal
Circuit sought an interpretive strategy that would provide it with unrestrained powers
of review.”).
62. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. Another area of patent law in which the court,
driven by the hypertextualists, has characterized as a question of law is “public use”
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). See Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed.
Cir. 1996), reh’g denied, 103 F.3d 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
63. Indeed, eliminating the jury from the claim interpretation analysis does not
mean, as de novo review would suggest, that factual determinations are also eliminated.
Judges frequently make factual determinations in non-jury trials.
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written.”64 Of note, the court went on to admonish that “this evidence
is not for the purpose of clarifying ambiguity in claim terminology.”65
As the court explained, “It is not ambiguity in the document that creates
the need for extrinsic evidence but rather unfamiliarity of the court with
the terminology of the art to which the patent is addressed.”66 Because
expert testimony is merely to be used as an educational tool, “the court
is not crediting certain evidence over other evidence or making factual
evidentiary findings.”67 However, in a seemingly contradictory
assertion, the majority also noted that “the focus” of a claim
interpretation analysis “is on the objective test of what one of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the
term to mean.”68 Thus, on the one hand, the artisan can be used only
as an “educational tool”; yet, on the other hand, the court is to discern
what the artisan “would have understood” the claim language to mean.
The majority’s conflicting language was highlighted by Judge
Newman in a lengthy dissent in which she characterized the litigation
system created by the majority opinion as “unworkable, and ultimately
unjust.”69 For Judge Newman, the role of the expert is indispensable
in interpreting claims because “[p]atents are technologic disclosures,
written by and for the technologically experienced: those ‘of skill in the
art.’”70 In adopting a de novo standard, the majority is denying that the
meaning and scope of disputed technical terms are classical questions
of fact that are most efficiently and effectively discovered at the trial
level. 71
The ideological lines were drawn in Markman I, and subsequent
cases provided the pragmatic textualists with an opportunity to

64. Markman, 52 F.3d at 986.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 981 (emphasis omitted).
68. Id. at 986 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 999. Judges Newman and Mayer also devoted much of their opinions to
the Constitutional implications of the majority opinion with respect to the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury issue.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 1006. Judge Newman also noted:
Inventors’ usages of words to describe their inventions, and the meaning
thereby conveyed to persons skilled in the field, are questions of fact, not
matters of law, in patent documents as in other written instruments. Disputes
concerning the meaning and usage of technical terms and words of art arise
in many areas of law. These disputes are resolved by the triers of fact,
whether judge or jury, in their established roles in the adjudicatory process.
Id. at 1007.
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elaborate upon their position.72 During the ensuing intra-circuit split, the
Supreme Court reviewed Markman I.
2. Markman II and the Origins of the Pragmatic Textualist Upheaval
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Souter,
unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding that claim
interpretation is solely for the judge. 73 The Court, like the Federal
Circuit, based its decision on “functional considerations” such as
uniformity and the judge’s “training in exegesis.”74 However, two
additional points need to be made about the Supreme Court’s Markman
opinion, the first concerning the relationship between expert testimony
and claim interpretation, and the second involving the proper standard
of review. The Supreme Court’s treatment, or lack thereof, of these
two issues provided both an affirmation of the hypertextualist’s position
and an impetus for a pragmatic textualist upheaval.

72. For example, in Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals, Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1996), Judge Newman again expressed her displeasure with Markman I. In
Hoechst, the claimed invention related to a method for reducing iodide contamination
in an organic medium by the addition of a macroreticulated silver-charged cation
exchange resin. The claim stated that the resin must be “stable in the organic medium.”
Id. at 1578. In the written description, “stable” was defined as that which would not
break down or “change more than about 50 percent of its dry physical dimension . . .
.” Id. at 1578–79 (emphasis added). The parties could not agree on the meaning of the
word “dimension.” Although the court ultimately relied on the written description to
resolve the dispute, Judge Newman was clearly receptive to extrinsic evidence introduced
during the trial:
The parties have provided us with photographs and experimental
data, the testimony of the scientists who produced the data and
interpreted it, and the testimony of experts in the field. Markman
[I] limits appellate reliance on extrinsic evidence to evidence in
explanation of the technology and technical terms . . . .
However, we have found it necessary to rely on the evidence
presented at the trial and credit certain evidence over other
evidence, for we are not personally qualified to know the scientific
meanings of “stable” and “dimension” as applied to
macroreticulated cation-exchange resins in organic medium.
Id. at 1579. Judge Mayer has also expressed his discontent with M a r k m a n I. See, e.g.,
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Maye r , J . ,
concurring) (“I continue to believe that Markman was wrongly decided.”).
73. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
74. Id. at 388.
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a. “Internal Coherence” and the Role of Extrinsic Evidence
In holding that claim interpretation was solely an issue for the
judge, the Supreme Court addressed the jury’s role in making credibility
determinations.75 The Court stated that “any credibility determinations
will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the
whole document.”76 Thus, while recognizing the value of expert
testimony, the Court emphasized the primacy of the patent’s text as an
interpretive tool. According to the Court, “[t]he decisionmaker vested
with the task of construing the patent is in the better position to
ascertain whether an expert’s proposed definition fully comports with
the specification and claims and so will preserve the patent’s internal
coherence.”77 Juries typically make credibility determinations that “are
much less significant than a trained ability to evaluate the testimony in
relation to the overall structure of the patent.”78 The hypertextualists
have understood the Court’s subsumption of credibility determinations
“within the whole document” and emphasis on the preservation of the
“patent’s internal coherence” to mean that the intrinsic record enjoys a
certain interpretive primacy. While expert testimony may be helpful
from an “educational” standpoint, it cannot contradict the unambiguous
text of the patent.
Consider the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 79 the first significant claim interpretation case after
Markman II. The court in Vitronics provided district court judges and
the patent bar with an interpretive, if not mechanical, road map that,
when read properly, would rarely lead to the use of expert testimony.
The court stated that “where the public record [i.e., claims, written
description, and prosecution history] unambiguously describes the
scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is
improper.”80 The rationale is that “competitors are entitled to review the
public record, apply the established rules of claim construction,

75. See id. at 388–90.
76. Id. at 389.
77. Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
80. Id. at 1583. See also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Gypsum Co., 195
F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen intrinsic evidence is unambiguous, it is
improper for the court to rely on extrinsic evidence to contradict the meaning of the
claims.”); Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (“Often, the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed
claim term, and in such instances, reliance on extrinsic evidence is improper.”).
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ascertain the scope of the patentee’s claimed invention and, thus, design
around the claimed invention.”81 Vitronics clearly is a hypertextualist
case, but an interesting question arises from the court’s opinion: If it
is improper to consider extrinsic evidence when the intrinsic evidence
is unambiguous, then is it proper to consider extrinsic evidence when
the intrinsic evidence is ambiguous? This inference is seemingly
contrary to Markman I’s admonishment that “[i]t is not ambiguity in the
document that creates the need for extrinsic evidence.”82 But the
Federal Circuit, redolent of the parol evidence rule, has stated in a postVitronics opinion that “reliance on extrinsic evidence to interpret claims
is proper only when the claim language remains genuinely ambiguous
after consideration of the intrinsic evidence.”83 This statement, while
made in the context of criticizing the district court for improperly
considering expert testimony, seemed to open the door for the use of
expert testimony as an interpretive tool, in addition to its use as an
informational tool.
However, this ambiguity requirement has problems that lie at the
heart of a hypertextualist approach to claim interpretation. First, the
phrase “genuinely ambiguous” is itself ambiguous. Second, by
requiring a finding of ambiguity before permitting the use of expert
testimony as an interpretive aid, the hypertextualists, ironically, have
provided a perverse incentive for civil litigants to introduce evidence
tending to show ambiguity, further complicating the situation for the
district court judge. 84 Lastly, as claims are written by and for skilled
artisans,85 how is ambiguity discerned without considering extrinsic
81. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.
82. Markman, 52 F.3d at 987.
83. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
84. See, e.g., Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817, 825
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Sextant’s claim construction arguments hinge on an ironic
contention: that the evidence intrinsic to its own patent is ambiguous and insufficient
to construe the claims, thus requiring resort to extrinsic evidence such as expert
testimony.”); David J. Brezner, Presenting the Witnesses Special to a Patent Trial, in
P ATENT LITIGATION 1998, at 61, 75-76, (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-002O, 1998) (“[I]n order to set a
foundation for use of technical expert testimony on the meaning of specific claim
limitations, it is imperative for the party to establish an ambiguity in each of the
limitations for which such testimony is offered.”).
85. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Mayer, J., concurring) (“A patent . . . is written for a person of ordinary skill in an art;
it is not written for a court.”); James B. Altman et al., The Law of Patent Claim
Interpretation: The Revolution Isn’t Finished, 8 F ED. C IR. B.J. 93, 102–03 (1998)
(“ Vitronics — at least as a number of courts appear to have applied it — is inconsistent
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context?86 Indeed, “the decision that a text is ambiguous cannot be
made prior to the introduction of extrinsic evidence.”87 Meaning is not
“in the word”88; rather, it is in the technological social practice or
custom, and “usages and customs are a part of those circumstances by
which the meaning of words is to be judged.”89
Although there has arguably been a modest retreat from Vitronics, 90
the open door for the use of expert testimony as an interpretative tool
has proved to be illusory. Wedded solely to notions of “internal
coherence” and the notice function of the patent claim, the
hypertextualist majority has remained steadfast in their skepticism of
expert testimony.91 A particularly troubling trend is that in those rare

with the established standard for construing patent claims. The courts traditionally have
attempted to interpret them consistently with the understanding of persons skilled in
the relevant field of technology.
Yet Vitronics has been read to encourage judges to
ignore that understanding so long as the court thinks that the patent documents are
clear.”).
86. As stated by Arthur Corbin, well known for his narrow approach to the
application of the parol evidence rule, “[s]eldom should the court hold that the written
words exclude evidence of the custom, since even what are often called ‘plain’ meanings
are shown to be incorrect when all the circumstances of the transaction are known . .
. .” ARTHUR L. C O R B I N , C ORBIN ON C ONTRACTS § 555 at 239 (1960). With respect
to contract construction, Professor Farnsworth has noted that “the trend has favored
Corbin’s view.”
2 E. ALLAN F ARNSWORTH, F ARNSWORTH ON C ONTRACTS § 7.3,
at 216 (2d ed. 1998); see also Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol
Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretat i o n , 8 7 GEO.
L.J. 195, 205 (1998) (“The Restatement (Second) of Contracts radically departed from
its predecessor’s approach to plain meaning of contract text and to the admissibility of
parol evidence, largely due to Corbin’s influence.”); Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Nat’l
Aeronautics & Space Admin., 169 F.3d 747, 753 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The [legal]
commentaries agree that courts should use evidence of trade practice and custom not
only to determine the meaning of an ambiguous provision, but to determine whether a
contract provision is ambiguous in the first instance.”).
87. Michaels, supra note 21, at 30.
88. Id.
89. C ORBIN, supra note 86, § 555, at 239.
In the context of contract
interpretation, Professor Farnsworth notes that the Supreme Court of Alaska has
abandoned the rule “that resort to extrinsic evidence can take place only after a
preliminary finding of ambiguity” on the ground that it is “artificial and unduly
cumbersome.” F ARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 7.12, at 294 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. O’Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 771 n.1 (Alaska 1982).
90. See, e.g., Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308–09
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir.
1998). I should note that I am talking about a district court’s reliance on extrinsic
evidence, not admissibility.
91. In many ways, the hypertextualist approach to claim interpretation is analogous
to a hypertextualist application of the Chevron doctrine.
See Pierce, supra note 12.
The Chevron doctrine requires an appellate court reviewing an agency’s interpretation
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instances where intrinsic ambiguity is found, the hypertextualists,
without considering extrinsic evidence, have applied default rules or
canons of claim construction.92 Default rules are essential to claim
construction,93 but the application of a default rule should come after
extrinsic evidence is heard. Prior to introduction of extrinsic evidence
the existence vel non of ambiguity and the type of ambiguity are
uncertain.94 Does “ambiguity” signify that the claim language is
unintelligible or, in patent parlance, indefinite? Or, does it denote that
the claim language can mean either A or B?95 Consideration of extrinsic
evidence ex ante is important in answering these questions. Assuming
the claim is ultimately found ambiguous, extrinsic evidence will most
likely determine the nature of the “ambiguity,” which will have a direct
impact on the claim’s validity under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2.96 If

of a statute initially to ask if Congress spoke to the issue at hand (i.e., is the statute
ambiguous). See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984). If the court finds that the statute is unambiguous, “that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43. On the other hand, if ambiguity exists,
the court must review the agency’s interpretation of the statute to determine whether
it is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”
Id. at 843.
Just as
hypertextualism on the Federal Circuit will rarely lead to a finding of claim ambiguity,
some commentators have asserted that “hypertextualism” on the Supreme Court has
seldom led to a finding of statutory ambiguity, thereby eviscerating the Chevron
doctrine. See Pierce, supra note 12; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH . U. L.Q. 351 (1994).
92. S e e , e . g . , Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 335–44 for a discussion of canons of claim
construction as default rules.
94. Judge Posner has written in the context of contract interpretation:
A completely intractable issue of contract interpretation can be
resolved only by the application of some default rule . . . . But the
time to throw up one’s hands and apply such a rule is after
extrinsic evidence has been considered. For until then, we do not
know whether we have an intractable interpretive issue or merely
an issue that cannot be resolved without testimony or other
evidence besides the language and logic . . . of the contract.
Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
95. See, e.g., A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(noting that the district court decided that the limitation that the droplets are “deflected
laterally” was ambiguous, for it could mean deflection “lateral” of the undisturbed stream
of droplets from the nozzle or the deflection “lateral” of the movement between nozzle
and paper).
96. 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires the patent applicant to “particularly point[] out and
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” See
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ambiguity means that the claim language can mean either A or B, then
the validity of that claim is likely to be upheld.97 However, if the claim
language is indefinite (i.e., there are no competing constructions), the
claim will probably be invalidated.98
b. Claim Interpretation as a “Mongrel Practice”
The second point relating to the Supreme Court’s Markman
decision concerns the proper standard of review for claim
interpretation. Although not directly addressing this issue, the Court, in
what proved to be controversial dicta, stated that the issue of claim
interpretation is a “mongrel practice”99 that “falls somewhere between
a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact.”100 This language
breathed new life into the pragmatic textualists, who, sensing an
opening, conflated the issues of expert testimony and standard of
review. These judges, using hypertextualism’s own terms, eagerly
seized upon Justice Souter’s law/fact language to assert that claim
interpretation involved significant factual determinations centering
around the use of expert testimony.101 Because claim interpretation was

Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating “whether a claim is definite requires an analysis of ‘whether
one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the claim when read in light of the
specification . . . . If the claims read in light of the specification reasonably apprise
those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention, § 112 demands no more.’”); N.
Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Whether
a claim is invalid for indefi niteness depends on whether those skilled in the art would
understand the scope of the claim when the claim is read in light of the specification.”).
97. See, e.g., Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1581 (“Where there is an equal
choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling
disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the
narrower meaning, [the] notice function of the claim [is] best served by adopting the
narrower meaning.”); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 93 F.3d at 1581–82 (applying Athletic
Alternatives default rule). Of course, as Judge Nies advocated in Athletic Alternatives , the
claim may alternatively be invalidated under this scenario. See Athletic Alternatives, 73
F.3d at 1583 (Nies, J., concurring in resul t ) .
See infra text accompanying notes
335–44.
98. See, e.g., Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1470 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (holding patent claims invalid for indefiniteness); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1217–18 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding patent claims invalid
for indefiniteness).
99. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996).
100. Id. at 388.
101. Ideally, for the pragmatic textualists, the law/fact distinction should be avoided.
However, given this opening in Markman II and the constraints of Federal Circuit
precedent, the pragmatic textualists perhaps felt that change could best be realized by
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not a pure question of law, the pragmatic textualists argued that de novo
review, while acceptable for the ultimate legal conclusion on claim
scope, was not the sole standard of review. Rather, the court should
review the factual findings more deferentially. This argument allowed
the pragmatic textualists to advance what they considered to be a
central precept of claim interpretation: extrinsic evidence plays a
fundamental role in claim construction.
B. An Ideological Badinage in the Wake of Markman II
In the wake of Markman II, the hypertextualists continued to
emphasize the primacy of the intrinsic record and the de novo standard
of review.102 Although they opined that extrinsic evidence may be used
as an interpretive tool in the face of ambiguity, the hypertextualists, as
mentioned above, nearly always found that the intrinsic record was
clear on its face. 103 In contrast, the pragmatic textualists were
persistent in stressing not only the importance of the intrinsic record,
but also the necessity of extrinsic evidence in claim interpretation. As
a normative matter for the pragmatic textualist, a threshold finding of
textual ambiguity is not necessary, or even possible, before considering
extrinsic evidence. Therefore, like Arthur Corbin 104 and his student Karl
Llewellyn,105 the pragmatic textualist would always admit extrinsic

addressing hypertextualism on its own terms.
102. See, e.g., Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom, Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1464 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (“Claim construction is a question of law, and therefore we review the district
court's claim interpretation de novo.”).
103. One may argue that the text of the patent may have been facially clear or the
technology at issue was relatively simple, and therefore extrinsic evidence was not
needed. But what may seem plain or simple to a judge may actually be understood as
more complex by an artisan.
We just don’t know.
As Judge Easterbrook noted,
“[w]hat seems clear to a judge may read otherwise to a skilled designer.” In re Mahurkar
Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation).
104. See C ORBIN, supra note 86, § 555, at 239 (stating that “usages and customs are
a part of those circumstances by which the meaning of words is to be judged”); see a l s o
Michaels, supra note 21, at 27 (“[W]here the Restatement admits extrinsic evidence
only in the case of an ambiguity in the contract itself, Corbin would have required no
such prima facie ambiguity. He insisted rather that ambiguity is itself a product of
extrinsic evidence, and so would have allowed extrinsic evidence at all times so long as
it was for the purpose of interpretation and not contradiction.”).
105. See Ross & Tranen, supra note 86, at 228 (“Llewellyn, in particular,
successfully advocated the enforcement of contracts with a minimum number of
agreed-upon terms, at the same time that he and others were liberalizing the parol
evidence rule to facilitate the admission of extrinsic evidence to prove that the parties
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evidence when construing claim language. 106 Arguably, from an
epistemological perspective, Llewellyn’s merchant juror is to
commercial law what a PHOSITA is to patent law.107
Furthermore, the pragmatic textualists asserted that the
characterization of claim interpretation as a question of law is artificial;
if forced to affix a label, claim interpretation is a mixed question of law
and fact. Therefore, they pushed for a bifurcated standard of review,
whereby the district court’s factual findings would be reviewed
deferentially, and the ultimate decision on claim scope would be subject
to de novo review. Needless to say, the hypertextualists, to put it
mildly, resisted this line of reasoning, and an ideological struggle
ensued.

actually had a ‘meeting of the minds’ on the relevant issue.”).
106. See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1481 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc) (Newman, J., joined by Judge Mayer, dissenting) (“Of course the
primary source of information concerning the claimed invention is the patent
documents. But such documents are directed to persons knowledgeable in the field;
additional evidence and expert testimony as to their meaning should be the rule, not the
exception. So-called ‘extrinsic’ evidence . . . should be treated like any other evidence,
and received and given weight and value as appropriate.”); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, J., joined
by Judge Mayer) (stating that “the testimony of one skilled in the art about the meaning
of claim terms at the time of the invention will almost always qualify as relevant
evidence”), abrogated on other grounds by Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456; see also Fromson
v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Newman, J., joined by
Judges Mayer and Rader) (discussing the importance of extrinsic evidence), abrogated
on other grounds by Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456.
107. See Revised Uniform Sales Act § 59 (1941). See generally Clayton P. Gillette,
Courts, Covenants, and Communities , 61 U. C HI. L. R EV. 1375, 1420 (1994)
(“Llewellyn's endorsement of merchant juries in commercial cases, for instance, was
largely mot ivated by his sense that merchants alone would be sufficiently familiar with
the specialized use of language and practice in commercial contracts to render verdicts
t hat accurately recited the intentions of the parties.”); Dennis M. Patterson, Good
Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 T EX. L. R EV. 169, 208 n.229 (1989) (“Llewellyn’s
posit ion on the merchant jury is fundamentally epistemological: he thought laypersons
were incapable of judging the reasonableness of commercial practices.”); Zipporah
Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100
HARV . L. R EV. 465, 512–13 (1987) (discussing rationale behind merchant jury).
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There are several cases representative of the hypertextualist108 and
pragmatic textualist109 positions, but I need only discuss one from each
camp and then the culminant case that, for now, added resolution.
The first and perhaps most significant hypertextualist case after
Markman II was Vitronics, 1 10 briefly discussed above. The Federal
Circuit, holding that the district court erred in considering expert
testimony in the face of an “unambiguous” intrinsic record, reaffirmed
the majority’s position in Markman I. The invention in Vitronics related
to a method of soldering electrical devices to printed circuit boards.
The disputed claim term was “solder reflow temperature.” Vitronics
argued that this term meant “peak reflow temperature” (i.e., a
temperature 20 degrees higher than liquidus temperature) at which the
solder is melted and moves freely while Conceptronic asserted that the
term meant liquidus temperature, the same temperature at which solder
begins to melt.111 The district court heard expert testimony from
persons of ordinary skill in the art and agreed with those experts who
testified that solder reflow temperature and liquidus temperature were
used interchangeably.112
The Federal Circuit panel, comprised of Judges Michel, Lourie, and
Friedman, reversed the district court judge because “the claim, read in
light of the patent specification, clearly uses the term ‘solder reflow
temperature’ to mean the peak reflow temperature, rather than the
liquidus temperature, [and] that should have been the end of the trial
court’s analysis.”113 According to the court, extrinsic evidence could
be used to construe claim language “[o]nly if there [is] still some
genuine ambiguity in the claims, after consideration of all available
intrinsic evidence.”114 Although “[n]o doubt there will be instances in
which intrinsic evidence is insufficient to enable the court to determine
the meaning” of the claims, “[s]uch instances will rarely, if ever,
occur.”115 And, “[e]ven in those rare instances, prior art documents and
108. See Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
109. See Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938 (Fed. Cir. 1996); J.T. Eaton
& Co. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fromson
v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
110. 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
111. Id. at 1579–80.
112. See id. at 1585.
113. Id. at 1584.
114. Id.
For a discussion of the shortcomings of the Vitronics “ambiguit y
requirement,” see supra text accompanying notes 80–89.
115. Id. at 1584–85.
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dictionaries . . . are to be preferred over opinion testimony,” which
“should be treated with the utmost caution, for it is no better than
opinion testimony on the meaning of statutory terms.”116
The pragmatic textualists appeared to be emboldened by Vitronics.
In a series of opinions, the pragmatic textualists raised the stakes by
thrusting the issues of extrinsic evidence and standard of review onto
center stage. Of these cases, Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc. 117
is representative. The invention in Fromson pertained to a process for
anodizing aluminum, and the disputed claim term was “anodized.”118
The district court interpreted “anodized” based not only on a reading of
the intrinsic evidence, but also “on findings based on extrinsic evidence
derived from expert testimony, demonstrative evidence, and scientific
tests.”119 Fromson, the appellant, citing Markman I, asserted that the
claim term “anodized” had a plain meaning; therefore, the district
court’s reliance on extrinsic evidence was improper.120 Judge Newman,
joined by Judges Mayer and Plager, disagreed.
In her claim interpretation analysis, Judge Newman did not make
a threshold determination of intrinsic ambiguity before considering
extrinsic evidence. Rather, the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence were
treated as equals. As such, Fromson challenged both Vitronics and
Markman I. 121 According to Judge Newman:
Although Markman [I] presents a useful general rule,
it is adaptable to the needs of the particular case. In
this case the technical experts not only aided the
court’s understanding of the technology, but they also
provided evidence material to the interpretation of the
claims . . . .

116. Id. at 1585.
117. 132 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
118. See id. at 1441.
119. Id. at 1442.
120. Id. at 1444.
121. Recall, Markman I is less permissive than Vitronics with respect to the proper
use of extrinsic evidence. Whereas Vitronics permits the court to use extrinsic evidence
to construe claims when the intrinsic evidence is ambiguous, Markman I stated that “[i]t
is not ambiguity in the document that creates the need for extrinsic evidence but rather
unfamiliarity of the court with the terminology of the art to which the patent is
addressed.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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. . . This case illustrates the use of extrinsic evidence
in order to determine the meaning and scope of a
technical term as the term is used in the claims.122
Another interesting aspect of Fromson pertains to the issue of
standard of review. Although Judge Newman made no mention of this
issue, Judge Mayer wrote a concurrence, wherein, after emphasizing
the importance of expert testimony,123 he stated, “We are affirming [the
district court judge’s] claim construction as a matter of law based on
the facts he found from conflicting evidence, which are not clearly
erroneous.”124 Thus, in Fromson the majority treated extrinsic and
intrinsic evidence as equally important interpretive tools; in fact, the
concurrence explicitly suggested a standard of review directly at odds
with Markman I.
In the end, the Federal Circuit had no choice but to address en banc
the issue of extrinsic evidence and the proper allocation of interpretive
authority. In Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 125 the views of
the hypertextualists and pragmatic textualists found full expression, but,
when the dust settled, the former carried the day. The majority
addressed the pragmatic textualists’ reliance on Markman II’s language
that suggested claim interpretation is a mixed question of law and
fact, 1 26 stating that these “characterizations . . . are only prefatory
comments demonstrating the Supreme Court’s recognition” that the

122. Fromson, 132 F.3d at 1444.
123. Judge Mayer began his opinion by noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 says
that “expert testimony and evidence is [sic] admissible not only to educate but also to
find facts.” Id. at 1447. Thereafter, Judge Mayer noted that:
I am neither an expert in the field nor one of ordinary skill in the
art despite how much I think I “know” about a process I once
studied. Nor do my colleagues on this court or on the district court
possess such expertise, and even if they did, they would have to
defer to the record made in the case. The trial judge performed his
Daubert duty and allowed expert testimony and other evidence,
not only so that he might become better educated about the
meaning of anodization, but also so that he might develop the
record and find the meaning of anodization, as used in this patent,
to one skilled in the art in 1973 [when the original patent
application was filed].
Id. at 1448.
124. Id. at 1448.
125. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
126. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378, 388 (1996)
(stating that claim interpretation is a “mongrel practice” that “falls somewhere between
a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact”).
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law/fact issue “is not simple or clear cut.”127 The court insisted that
nothing in Markman II “supports the view that the Court endorsed a
silent, third option — that claim construction may involve subsidiary or
underlying questions of fact.”128 Indeed, Markman II understood the
importance of the Federal Circuit’s role in “providing national
uniformity to the construction of a patent claim . . . .”129 Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s silence on the standard of review was in fact an
implicit affirmation of Markman I’s holding that claim interpretation is
subject to de novo review.130
Judges Plager and Bryson each wrote a concurring opinion. Both
opinions, while endorsing a de novo standard of review, shied away
from the law/fact distinction and adopted more of a process approach.
Judge Plager wrote:
On appeal, this court has the benefit of the trial
judge’s considered view, and the record of the effort
made at trial to assist the judge in understanding the
terms of the claim. Though we review that record
“de novo,” meaning without applying a formally
deferential standard of review, common sense dictates
that the trial judge’s view will carry weight.131
Similarly, Judge Bryson opined, “[W]e approach the legal issue of claim
construction recognizing that with respect to certain aspects of the task,
the district court may be better situated than we are, and that as to those
aspects we should be cautious about substituting our judgment for that
of the district court.”132
One gets the impression from reading these concurring opinions
that Judges Plager and Bryson are uncomfortable with the
characterization of claim construction as one of law.133 Although they

127. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1456.
131. Id. at 1462. Judge Plager also showed signs of joining the pragmatic textualist
camp when he joined Judge Rader’s “additional views” in Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. HewlettPackard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1313–15.
132. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring).
133. “This court’s decision in Markman I, reaffirmed today, simply means that we
do not spend our and appellate counsels’ time debating whether the trial court’s
information base constitutes findings of ‘fact’ or conclusions of ‘law,’ with verbally
different standards of review. Instead, both they and we can focus on the question that
the trial court addressed, the question that counts: what do the claims mean?” Id. at
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both embrace de novo review, they would employ an institutional
competence analysis depending upon the nature of the evidence
considered by the district court. These concurrences are important
because they try to reconcile de novo review with the institutional
superiority of the district court judge with respect to underlying factual
determinations. When one looks closely enough, they do not diverge
significantly from the position of the pragmatic textualists.
In three separate opinions, the pragmatic textualists, as expected,
took a more pronounced position against the majority. Judge Mayer
concurred in the judgment and filed an opinion that was joined by Judge
Newman. Judge Rader dissented in part, joined in part, and concurred
in the judgment, and Judge Newman filed “additional views” with which
Judge Mayer joined.
In his opinion, Judge Mayer reiterated much of what he set forth
in Metaullics 1 3 4 and CVI/BETA135 and criticized the majority for
“profoundly misapprend[ing]” Markman II. 136 First, he asserted that the
Supreme Court did not affirm Markman I’s formulation of claim
construction as a question of law subject to de novo review. Rather,
the analysis in Markman II was largely focused on the Seventh
Amendment issue and the role of the jury in claim construction. The
Supreme Court, in holding that claim construction was solely for the
judge, said nothing about the proper standard of review.137 Therefore,
it is incorrect to read Markman II as an affirmation of Markman I’s
characterization of claim interpretation as a question of law reviewed de
novo. Second, “without the benefit of a full record from the trial court,
it is neither the function of this court nor is it within our capacity as an
appellate court to adopt new interpretations”; to do so “deprives the
parties of important substantive and procedural mechanisms provided
in the trial courts” and “would transform this court into a trial court of
first and usually last resort.”138

1462–63 (Plager, J., concurring).
134. Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
135. CVI/BETA Ventures, Inc. v. Tura L.P., 120 F.3d 1260, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(Mayer, J., dissenting).
136. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1463 (Mayer, J., concurring in the judgment).
137. “Rather than bluntly force the square peg of claim construction into the round
hole of fact or law, the Court described the questions presented by claim construction
in more chary terms . . . . Even a cursory reading of that opinion indicates that the
Court meant to determine who should interpret the claims, without mandating a standard
of appellate review to be used under all circumstances.” Id. at 1464 n.1.
138. Id. at 1466.
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Judge Rader’s opinion arguably established him as the leading voice
of pragmatic textualism on the court. He argued that the virtue of
Markman I is that it eliminated the jury’s susceptible and capricious
voice from claim interpretation and thereby “promised to improve the
predictability and uniformity of patent law.”139 The Cybor majority,
however, by taking the additional step of characterizing claim
construction as a question of law subject to de novo review “will
undermine, if not destroy,” the promise of Markman I and II. 140 Thus,
Judge Rader turned the tables on the majority: whereas the majority
cited certainty and predictability as justifications for its holding, Judge
Rader posited that the holding in Cybor was a portent of quite the
opposite.
In support of this proposition, Judge Rader devoted a significant
portion of his opinion to discussing the district court’s institutional
superiority with respect to claim interpretation. This approach should
not come as a surprise because Judge Rader has, on at least two
occasions, sat by designation as a district court judge in patent
infringement proceedings.141 This experience undoubtedly influenced
his perspective on the proper allocation of interpretive authority
concerning the issue of claim construction. Judge Rader focused on
the “functional approach” of Markman II and asserted that a similar
approach “might best clarify the roles of the trial and appellate benches
during claim interpretation.”142 According to Judge Rader, a judge’s
goal “is to discern the meaning of the claim terms to one of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of invention.”1 43 Therefore, “claim
construction requires assessment of custom and usage in the relevant
art” and an “assessment of the understanding of skilled artisans at the
time of invention.”144 Emphasis on “custom and usage” does not mean
that the extrinsic record can contradict or be inconsistent with the

139. Id. at 1473.
140. Id. at 1474 (Rader, J., dissenting in part, joining in part, concurring in the
judgment).
141. See Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 931 F.Supp. 1014 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (Rader, J., sitting by designation); Ristvedt-Johnson, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 805 F.
Supp. 557 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (Rader, J., sitting by designation).
142. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1477 (Rader, J., dissenting in part, joining in part,
concurring in the judgment).
143. I d . at 1475. As Judge Newman succinctly put it, “patent documents are written
by and for persons in the field of the invention, not for judges.” Id. at 1480 (Newman,
J., additional views).
144. Id. at 1478 (Rader, J., dissenting in part, joining in part, concurring in the
judgment).
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intrinsic record. Rather, it means that testimony from a PHOSITA
should be embraced and given appropriate weight.145 With that in mind,
“the trial judge enjoys a potentially superior position to engage in claim
interpretation”146 because
[t]rial judges can spend hundreds of hours reading and
rereading all kinds of source material, receiving
tutorials on technology from leading scientists,
formally questioning technical experts and testing their
understanding against that of various experts,
examining on site the operation of the principles of the
claimed invention, and deliberating over the meaning
of the claim language. . . . An appellate court has none
of these advantages.147
Concomitant to the institutional advantage a district court judge
enjoys with respect to expert testimony, there is a temporal benefit.
That is, greater deference to the district court will lead to early certainty
and resolution of claim scope, which in turn may induce early
settlement.148 According to Judge Rader, a de novo standard of review
discourages parties from settling because they are fully aware that there
is a good chance that the Federal Circuit will reverse the district court’s
claim construction.149 Thus, the Cybor majority’s reading of Markman

145. Judge Rader is careful to remain faithful to the intrinsic record. For example,
he states “this relevant [expert] testimony must not conflict with or attempt to trump
contemporaneous intrinsic evidence from the patent document itself.”
Id. at 1475.
This assertion begs the question: At what point does extrinsic evidence stop aiding in
understanding claim meaning and start contradicting intrinsic evidence? In my opinion,
when the judge, after being assisted by an independent court-appointed expert, will have
an understanding of what the claim language means and can determine if the extrinsic
evidence is being offered to contradict the claim meaning.
146. Id. at 1477.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 1475.
149. See id. at 1475–77. Pointing to empirical evidence, Judge Rader writes:
[O]ne study shows that the plenary standard of review has
produced reversal, in whole or in part, of almost 40% of all claim
constructions since Markman I.
A reversal rate in this range
reverses more than the work of numerous trial courts;
it also
reverses the benefits of Markman I.
In fact, this reversal rate,
hovering near 50%, is the worst possible. Even a rate that was
much higher would provide greater certainty.
Id. at 1476.
These figures were based on a survey of every Federal Circuit decision rendered
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I “means that the trial court’s early claim interpretation provides no
early certainty at all, but only opens the bidding.”150
Also weighing in against the majority was Judge Newman. Her
“additional views” bemoaned the uncertainties brought about by
Markman I’s de novo review. Judge Newman both endorsed the
process considerations emphasized by Judge Rader and focused on the
role of the artisan in claim interpretation. With respect to the former,
Judge Newman asserted that the majority’s holding that claim
interpretation does not entail fact-finding amounted to a “fiction.”1 5 1
The entire “fact/law theory”of Markman I was an “artificial construct”
that created a zero sum game that enhanced the power of the appellate
judge at the expense of the trial judge. 152 In Markman II, the Supreme
Court “opened the door” for the Federal Circuit to retreat from this false
“fact/law” dichotomy and “did not shut out the trial judge along with the
jury.”153
Judge Newman then proceeded to discuss the benefits of expert
testimony to claim interpretation. Like Judge Rader, she emphasized
that claim meaning must be discerned by asking what a PHOSITA
would understand the claim to mean at the time the claim language was
drafted. Expert testimony is crucial to this determination, and the
majority’s constraints on the use of such testimony operate as an
“unnecessary bar to enlightenment.”154 Thus, reaffirming her position

between April 5, 1995 (the date Markman I was decided) and November 24, 1997. The
total number of cases was 246, of which 141 expressly reviewed the claim interpretation
of the lower tribunal (i.e., district courts, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, and
the Court of Federal Claims). Of the 141 cases, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower
tribunal’s claim construction, in whole or in part, “54 [times] or 38.3%.” Id. at 1476
n.4. The appellate court reversed the claim interpretation of the district courts and the
Court of Federal Claims “47 out of 126 [times] or 37. 3%.” Id. Furthermore, in a
recent public speech, Judge Lourie noted that “district court patent cases have been
reversed 18% in toto and 23% in part, for a total of 41% of patent appeals that have
produced some benefit to appellant.” Judge Alan D. Lourie, Speech to PTC Section of
Washington, D.C. Bar (June 12, 2000) , in 60 P AT. T RADEMARK & C OPYRIGHT J.
147, 148 (2000). Judge Lourie further stated that of the 41%, “27% were on claim
constru c t i o n . ” Id. See also TM Patents, L.P. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 72 F. Supp.
2d. 370, 377 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Given the frequency with which the Federal Circuit
overrules District Court judges on issues of claim interpretation . . . [interlocutory]
appeals would save millions of dollars and thousands of hours of trial time based on
patent constructions that turn out to be erroneous.”).
150. Cybor., 138 F.3d at 1476.
151. Id. at 1480.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1481.
154. Id.
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in Fromson, 155 Judge Newman maintained that expert testimony should
be considered, regardless of whether ambiguity exists:156
Of course the primary source of information
concerning the claimed invention is the patent
documents. But such documents are directed to
persons knowledgeable in the field; additional
evidence and expert testimony as to their meaning
should be the rule, not the exception. So-called
“extrinsic” evidence . . . should be treated like any
other evidenc e, and received and given weight and
value as appropriate. 157
Similar to Judge Rader’s assertion in Eastman Kodak that “the
testimony of one skilled in the art about the meaning of claim terms at
the time of the invention will almost always qualify as relevant
evidence,”158 Judge Newman would place expert testimony on equal
footing with the intrinsic record.159 By considering extrinsic evidence

155. Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
abrogated on other grounds by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
156. Cybor., 138 F.3d at 1480 (Newman, J., additional views) (“The Federal Circuit’s
ruling that extrinsic evidence must be restricted unless there is a facial ambiguity in the
meaning of the claim is an unnecessary restraint on potentially useful evidence.”).
157. Id. at 1481 (emphasis added). See also F ARNSW O R T H , supra note 22, § 7.10,
at 512. (“Since the purpose of [contract interpretation] is to ascertain the meaning to
be given to the language, there should be no requirement that the language be ambiguous,
vague, or otherwise uncertain before the inquiry is undertaken.”); Michaels, supra note
21, at 30 (“For one thing, . . . the decision that a text is ambiguous cannot be made
prior to the introduction of extrinsic evidence.”).
158. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456.
159. In a post-Cybor opinion, Judge Newman, in perhaps her strongest language to
date, again stressed the importance of extrinsic evidence:
The panel majority, having rejected the expert testimony adduced
at the trial on the ground that it is “extrinsic,” excludes itself from
access to this evidence and whatever scientific truth it comports.
I believe it is seriously incorrect to foreclose consideration of
such “extrinsic” evidence. It is increasingly recognized that courts
must be enabled and encouraged to receive and understand the
guidance of experts. The scientific witnesses for both sides agreed
as to the uncertainties of this chemistry and the ensuing ambiguity
of interpretation of the claims in light of the state of the art when
the invention was made.
This court’s refusal to consider the
evidence of experts for both sides . . . is not the path to
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before a finding of textual ambiguity, Judges Newman and Rader
recognize that plain meaning is a “function[] not of texts but of the
situations in which we read them.”160
We should note at this point that tw o of the three pragmatic
textualists agree that extrinsic evidence should be considered
irrespective of intrinsic ambiguity.
Or stated another way,
consideration of extrinsic evidence “should be the rule, not the
exception.”161 Based upon Judge Mayer’s opinions and the emphasis he
places on the artisan’s role in our patent system, it is plausible, if not
probable, that he would subscribe to this approach as well. As Judge
Newman noted, “patent documents are written by and for” persons of
ordinary skill in the art.162 Thus, the understanding and information that
experts bring to bear on claim interpretation is as much a part of the
public record and is entitled to as much weight as the claims, written
description, and prosecution history. Expert testimony, in other words,
is actually a part of the intrinsic evidence because artisans of a
particular technical community share a common language. 163 This
seems to be eminently sensible and is in accord with contemporary legal
and hermeneutic philosophy.164 How is a judge to interpret a document
if he is not initially permitted to consider the views of the document’s
intended audience? Markman I’s distinction between allowing expert
testimony to be used to understand the technology, but not to interpret
the claims, is really a distinction without a difference. As Judge Rader
aptly noted,
As a matter of logic, this instruction is difficult to
grasp. What is the distinction between a trial judge’s

enlightenment on the complexities of polymer chemistry and
technology. Judicial doubt cannot be resolved by exclusion of the
evidence that explains the scientific issues.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 878–79 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (Newman, J., concurring in judgment).
160. Michaels, supra note 21, at 33; see also F ARNSWORTH, supra note 22, § 7.10,
at 512-13; E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939,
957–63 (1967).
161. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1481 (Newman, J., additional views).
162. Id. at 1480.
163. Of course, there may be disagreement within a given community; however, the
disagreement is confined within community parameters that are acknowledged and
understood by members of the community. For a discussion of the approach that should
be taken when there is disagreement over a particular claim term, see text
accompanying notes 310–46.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 226–309.
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understanding of the claims and a trial judge’s
interpretation of the claims to the jury? . . . . What
happens when that learning influences a trial judge’s
interpretation of the claim terms? Are trial judges
supposed to disguise the real reasons for their
interpretation?165
With strained reasoning, the hypertextualists are forced to
manufacture legal fictions, whether it be characterizing claim
interpretation as a pure question of law, requiring a finding of an
intrinsic ambiguity before expert testimony can be considered, or
permitting the use of expert testimony only as an educational tool.
These fictions were devised and are maintained in the name of certainty,
uniformity, and predictability. Ironically, the result has been contra166
— a result that is antithetical to patent law’s incentive dynamic.
C. Ex Post Innovation Theories
One of the fundamental distinctions between pragmatic textualism
and hypertextualism is that the former’s interpretive method is more
sensitive to consequences. This consequentialism is not only reflective
of American patent law’s utilitarian roots, but is also germane to ex post
innovation theories.
Ex post innovation theories — namely,
improvement theory and design-around theory — focus on inducements
to artisans to build upon or design around extant patented technology.
The manner in which patent claims are interpreted and their resulting
scope directly affect the nature of the inducement.167

165. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1474–75 (Rader, J., dissenting in part, joining in part,
concurring in the judgment).
166. See William F. Lee and Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman: A
Prescription for the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 1 3 HARV . J.L. & T ECH .
55, 67 (1999) (“Although, according to the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court,
Markman should have ushered in greater uniformity, predictability, and certainty in
patent litigation, many believe that the holding has had the opposite effect. This is
largely because Federal Circuit review of claim interpretation is de novo.”) In lamenting
the “disappointed expectations” of Markman I, Judge Newman has written that the
Federal Circuit has engaged in “creative de novo claim interpretations” on appeal.
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1479.
According to Judge Newman, “[t]his unpredictability in
administration of the law of patent claiming has added a sporting element to our bench.”
Id.
See also supra note 149, discussing the reversal rate of district court claim
interpretations.
167. See infra note 188.
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Hypertextualism is arguably inconsistent with a viable ex post
innovation theory. Whereas the pragmatic textualist appreciates that
“meaning depends on both culture and context,”168 the hypertextualist
refuses to delve into the linguistic practices of the relevant technological
community, choosing instead to excavate the patent text with, at times,
Schliemann-like intensity. By denying the expert his say on claim
meaning, the hypertextualist ignores the decentralized nature of
technical knowledge. 169 The hypertextualist further ignores the fact that
persons of ordinary skill in the art stand upon the shoulders of their
predecessors and have a contextual understanding of the relevant
technical language.
1. Improvement Theory
One of the fundamental policies of patent law is “to promote
disclosure of inventions” so as to “stimulate further innovation.”170
Building upon preexisting knowledge is central to efficient technological
advancement.171 As Edmund Kitch writes, “each innovation generates
shifts in the matrix of technological possibilities, and the realization of

168. C ASS R. S UNSTEIN, AFTER TH E R IGHTS R EVOLUTION: R ECONCEIVING THE
R EGULATORY S TATE 114 (1990); see also George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism,
75 B.U. L. R EV. 321, 362–66 (1995).
169. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. R EV.
519 (1945), reprinted in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77–78 (1948):
“[D]ata” from which the economic calculus starts are never for the
whole society “given” to a single mind which could work out the
implications and can never be so given.
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic
order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the
circumstances of which we must make use never exists in
concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the
separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is
. . . . how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the
members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these
individuals know.
Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the
utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its
totality.
170. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
171. See R ICHARD R. NELSON & S I D N E Y G. W INTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY
T HEORY OF ECONOMIC C HANGE 130 (1982); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson,
On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. R EV. 839 (1990); Suzanne
Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, 5 J. ECON. P ERSP . 29, 30–31 (1991).

No. 1]

Claim Interpretation Theory

39

the possibilities may have a significance that dwarfs the original
invention considered alone.”172
When we speak of “improvement patents,” however, we must keep
in mind one of the basic tenets of patent law: one may obtain a patent
on a particular invention, yet still infringe an extant patent. Consider the
following example:
Inventor 1 patents a widget comprising elements A, B,
and C. Inventor 2 improves upon inventor 1's
invention by adding D, thus giving inventor 2 a patent
on a widget comprising elements A, B, C, and D
(assume D is a nonobvious addition to A, B, and C).
Although [having a patent,] Inventor 2 cannot practice
his invention because Inventor 2's invention contains
each and every element (A, B, and C) claimed in
Inventor 1's patent, thus infringing Inventor 1's patent.
On the other hand, Inventor 1 cannot practice
Inventor 2's invention without the permission of the
latter.173
What we have in this situation is known in patent law as “blocking
patents,” a situation that is largely influenced by market forces. At least
three things can happen: (1) the parties cross-license each other — a
particularly attractive choice if the improvement adds significant value
to the original patent;174 (2) the parties sell the patents to a third party
who will coordinate future development and improvement; or (3) the
parties fail to come together for whatever reason (e.g., high transaction
costs) and no one (the patentee, the improver or society) enjoys the
improvement.175
172. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 271 (1977).
173. DONALD S. C HISUM ET AL., P RINCIPLES OF P ATENT LAW 5, n.16 (1998).
174. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 n.5 (1931)
(referring to cross-licensing, the court stated “[t]his is often the case where patents
covering improvements of a basic process, owned by one manufacturer, are granted to
another. A patent may be rendered quite useless, or ‘blocked,’ by another unexpired
patent which covers a vitally related feature of the manufacturing process.”).
175. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 T EX. L. R EV. 989, 1067 n. 350 (1997) (“While it might seem irrational to
think that an original inventor would suppress an improvement within her control if it
truly was valuable, several circumstances might induce her to do so. If the improvement
requires a new manufacturing technology or a different market approach, there may be
substantial fixed costs associated with switching over production from the old to the new
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The point to be made here is that the improver has bargaining
power in the form of a patented invention. There is a significant
difference between being an improver with a patent and an improver
without a patent. Without a patent, not only will the improver infringe
the extant patent, but he will be unable to preclude others from using his
unpatented improvement. On the other hand, a patent, while not
allowing the improver to escape liability for infringement, will arm the
improver with bargaining power as he is now able to preclude others,
including the owner of the infringed patent, from making, using, or
selling the improver’s invention. Confidence in the validity of the
improver’s patent is of the utmost importance in this regard. The
improver needs to know that when a court interprets the claims in
evaluating the validity of his patented improvement, the court will
consider the same linguistic customs and underlying assumptions that
the improver himself considered when studying the prior art (including
a competitor’s patent) and when drafting his own patent application.
Let’s take a step back and look at the improvement process. There
are times when the written description of a patent itself will suggest to
an improver a particular idea or experiment that will not infringe the
patent. The improver will then proceed with his experimentation
without the need to negotiate a license with the original patent owner.
However, most of the time the improver must make use of the patented
invention in his research, in which case the improver will either have to
purchase the patented product on the open market176 or obtain a license
ex ante from the patent holder to use the patented technology. It is
anything but a forgone conclusion that the patent holder will agree to
grant the improver a license, especially if the improver poses a
commercial threat to the patent holder or the transaction costs are
otherwise prohibitively high.177 Nevertheless, a court can facilitate ex

way. The further removed the improvement is from the original invention, the worse
this problem is likely to be . . . . The alternative to switching over production facilities
. . . is also unlikely to be attractive to the original inventor. Even if the licensor could
extract the full value of the improvement in a licensing transaction, which seems
unlikely, its market control will disappear along with the intellectual property right.”).
For a general discussion of blocking patents, see Robert Merges, Intellectual Property
Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 T ENN. L. R EV.
75 (1994).
176. This conveys an implied license to use the product. See United States v. Univis
Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942).
177. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. C HI. L. R EV. 1017, 1072–74 (1989) (“The risk that the
parties will be unable to agree on terms for a license is greatest when subsequent
researchers want to use prior inventions to make further progress in the same field in
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ante licensing by employing interpretive analyses that lend themselves
to predictability of claim scope and accurate valuation of the improved
invention as well as the original patent.178 A hypertextualist approach to
claim interpretation silences the voices of those who will most likely be
significantly involved in negotiating a license. If it is probable that a
court will interpret a particular technical term as that term is understood
in the industry, then the parties will have a good idea of where the
proprietary fence lies as well as the commercial value of the inventions
at issue.
However, there is a significant possibility that negotiations will
occur ex post.179 At this point the claim scope of the original patent
becomes crucial because the risks of proceeding with improvement
activity are directly affected by the original patent’s claim scope. 180
Several commentators have asserted that a broad construction of the
original patent may adversely affect the incentive for improvement
activity.181 Therefore, in order to encourage the development of
improvement patents, the claims of the original patent should be
construed narrowly so as not to capture the improvement. Others have
argued that incentives should be focused on the original patentee, thus
forcing the improver to negotiate a license or forego use of the

competition with the patent holder, especially if the research threatens to render the
patented invention technologically obsolete.”); see also JOHN W. S CHLICHER,
LICENSING INTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY 47–48, 86 (1996) (“The primary transaction
costs are 1. The information costs of identifying buyers and sellers, and informing
buyers of the rights for sale, and 2. The costs of negotiating agreements, performing
under them, and detecting and stopping violations.”). But see Frank H. Easterbrook,
Cyberspace versus Property Law?, 4 TEX. R EV. L. & P OL. 85, 111 (1999) (asserting
that technology is reducing the cost of bargaining).
178. Cf. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 C A L. L. R EV. 1293 (1996) (discussing
cross-licensing and cooperative arrangements in various technological fields).
179. See John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent
Breadth and Sequential Innova t i o n , 6 5 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 453 (1997) (“[I]t seems
likely that many actual improvement invention situations will be, at least in part, ex
post, for the improvement inventors will often independently gain the key insight
looking to an improvement and then have to invest significantly in understanding its
implications before they can knowledgeably negotiate with the initial inventor. Thus,
the second firm's investment decisions must be tempered by the risk that the negotiation
will not turn out well.”).
180. See, e.g., Scotchmer, sup r a note 171; Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On
the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1995); Howard
F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 R AND J.
ECON. 34 (1995); Merges & Nelson, supra note 171; Kitch, supra note 172.
181. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 171; Barton, supra note 179.
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invention.182 The point I wish to make here is not that the original patent
should be construed broadly or narrowly. Rather, I assert that a court
must be sensitive to the issue of claim scope and have an intimate (or
as intimate as possible) understanding of the respective contributions to
the art in question in order to properly balance the incentives of the
original patentee with those of the improver. Unlike pragmatic
textualism with its emphasis on context and consequences,183
hypertextualism fosters a disconnect between claim interpretation and
industry practices, thus enhancing the likelihood of misreading and
misjudging the incentive dynamic.
With that said, the would-be improver may channel his inventive
energies elsewhere when licensing negotiations break down or the risks
associated with improvement activity are too great.184 One alternative
is for the improver to “design-around” the patented invention in an
attempt to avoid infringement altogether.
2. Design-Around Theory
We know that sometimes the parties simply cannot come to terms
during licensing negotiations and improvement activity may prove too
risky. Faced with the uninviting choice between the high transaction
costs associated with licensing and the high costs of litigation, the
competitor may opt to “design-around” the patented technology. As the
term “design-around” suggests, a competitor of the patentee may
purposefully circumvent the boundaries of the patent claim and create
a competitive, non-infringing alternative to the claimed invention. The
practice of designing-around extant patents creates viable substitutes
and advances, resulting in competition among patented technologies.185

182. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, Protecting Early Innovators: Should SecondGeneration Products Be Patentable?, 27 R AND J. ECON. 322 (1996); Green &
Scotchmer, supra note 180.
183. See P OSNER, supra note 1, at 19 (“Pragmatists want the law to be more
empirical, more realistic, more attuned to the real needs of real people.”).
184. This is not to say that the improver may not proceed in his experimentation
without a license, particularly if the improver was confident that he could patent the
improvement and thus better position himself at the bargaining table with the original
patentee. See Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 1044 (“Some subsequent researchers might
find it worthwhile to improve a patented invention even without a license if the
improvement itself were patentable.”).
185. Several economists and courts have asserted that a patent grant does not
necessarily translate into monopolistic market power.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ,
ECONOMIC AND F EDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 156, 219 (1985) (“[A] patented product
. . . may compete intensely with similar products which are either unpatented or covered
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The public clearly benefits from such activity.186 As the Federal Circuit
recently stated, “[o]ne of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called
‘negative incentive’ to ‘design around’ a competitor’s products, even
when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to
the marketplace.”187
To design-around a patent claim, the competitor must know with
some particularity and certainty where the patentee’s proprietary interest
begins and ends so as to allow the competitor to produce a viable

by different patents . . . . More often than not the patent . . . makes a product
‘distinguishable’ but confers little or no measurable market power upon its owner.”);
F.M. S CHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET S TRUCTU R E A N D E C O N O M I C P ERFORMANCE
446 (2d ed. 1980) (“[F]ew patents are sufficiently basic and broad to ‘fence in’ a field
altogether.”).
See also Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), wherein she rejected the majority’s
presumption that a patent or copyright leads to market power:
A common misperception has been that a patent or copyright . .
. suffices to demonstrate market power. While . . . [this factor]
might help to give market power to a seller, it is also possible that
a seller in these situations will have no market power: for example,
a patent holder has no market power in any relevant sense if there
are close substitutes for the patented product.
Id. at 37, n.7 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952
F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[a] patent does not of itself establish a presumption
of market power in the antitrust sense.”); Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v.
Target Prods., Inc., No. CV 92-1523-LGB, 1992 WL 465720 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 1992),
aff’d mem. , 19 F.3d 41 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Of course, there are occasions where a patent,
particularly a pharmaceutical patent, in and of itself confers monopolistic market
power.
186. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“Designing around patents is . . . one of the ways in which the patent system
works to the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its
constitutional purpose.”).
187. State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
see also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (“The ability of the public successfully to design around — to use the patent
disclosure to design a product or process that does not infringe, but like the claimed
invention, is an improvement over the prior art — is one of the important public
benefits that justify awarding the patent owner exclusive rights to his invention.”),
rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Even
after a patent has been awarded for a new, useful, and nonobvious practical application
of an idea, others may learn from the underlying ideas, theories, and principles to
legitimately ‘design around’ the patentee’s useful application.”); Yarway Corp. v. EurControl USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985). But see S CHERER, supra note
185, at 446 (arguing that resources used in designing around patents could be put to
better use); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L.
R EV. 450, 455 (1969).
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alternative without being subjected to an infringement suit.188 For this
to happen, however, competitors must have confidence in the court’s
ability to understand how the claim language that is purposely being
circumvented is used and understood in the relevant technological
community. Although a hypertextualist approach with its emphasis on
textual fidelity may seem ideal to fostering such confidence, upon closer
analysis hypertextualism can just as likely lead to misconceived and
costly innovation decisions. As Judge Newman has written:
Patent law is practiced mainly through legal advice and
counseling over the course of the commitment of
creative and capital resources, to manage legal risk in
the already risky business of industrial innovation.
Like all commercial law, the cost of guessing wrong
about the law and its application is rarely
recoverable. 189
Because “[p]atent law is practiced mainly through legal advice,” it
is common practice for a competitor, wishing to design-around a
claimed invention, to secure a “noninfringement opinion” from patent
counsel before making or using the design-around product. This
opinion is based on a study of the patent claims, prosecution history,
the prior art, and the competitor’s design-around product.190

188. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“[C]laims must be ‘particular’ and ‘distinct,’ as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, so that the
public has fair notice of what the patentee and the Patent and Trademark Office have
agreed constitute the metes and bounds of the claimed invention. Notice permits other
parties to avoid actions which infringe the patent and to design around the patent.”).
189. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?,
42 AM. U. L. R EV. 683, 687 (1993); see also Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816,
828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Of course, determining when a patented device has been
‘designed around’ enough to avoid infringement is a difficult determi nation to make.
One cannot know for certain that changes are sufficient to avoid infringem e n t u n t i l a
judge or a jury has made that determination.”), abrogated by Markman v. Westview
Instuments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
190. See Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The steps
‘normally considered to be necessary and proper in preparing an opinion’ include a
thorough review of the cited prior art and prosecution history.”); Underwater Devices,
Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Had [the
infringement opinion] contained within its four corners a patent validity analysis,
properly and explicitly predicated on a review of the file histories of the patents at
issue, and an infringement analysis that, inter alia, compared and contras ted the
potentially infringing method or apparatus with the patented inventions, the opinion
may have contained sufficient internal indicia of credibility to remove any doubt that
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Importantly, because “counsel’s opinion must be thorough enough . .
. to instill a belief in the infringer that a court might reasonably hold the
patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable,”191 the attorney writing
the opinion must consult with the inventor or other artisans so as to
comprehend fully the technology and technical terms at issue. Thus,
the opinion is frequently a joint product of the attorney and the artisan.
This reality highlights the artificial nature of hypertextualism and its
broad constraints on the use of extrinsic evidence. Whereas the author
of the “noninfringement opinion” seeks advice from persons of ordinary
skill in the art, the hypertextualist judge remains within the proverbial
four corners of the text.192 If the Federal Circuit w hear from the
artisan, how is it that the court expects alleged infringers, based on
opinion of counsel, to have a good faith belief that the “court might
reasonably hold the patent . . . invalid, not infringed, or
unenforceable?”193

III. PRAGMATIC TEXTUALISM : THROUGH THE EYES
OF AN ARTISAN
A. Extrinsic Context and the Role of Underlying
Assumptions
In Markman I, the hypertextualist majority eschewed expert
testimony as an interpretive tool and established a de novo standard of
review of a district court’s claim interpretation because
it is only fair (and statutorily required) that
competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree
the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude . . . .
They may understand what is the scope of the patent
owner’s rights by obtaining the patent and prosecution
history — “the undisputed public record,” — and
applying established rules of construction to the

M-K in fact received a competent opinion.”).
191. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also
Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1572.
192. Yet, a hypertextualist judge will criticize the alleged infringer for not
communicating with the attorney regarding issues of the relevant technology, validity,
and infringement. See Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178,
182–83 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Lourie, J.).
193. Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944.
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language of the patent claim in the context of the
patent. Moreover, competitors should be able to rest
assured, if infringement litigation occurs, that a judge,
trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the
patent and its associated public record and apply the
established rules of construction, and in that way
arrive at the true and consistent scope of the patent
owner’s rights to be given legal effect.194
The hypertextualists are indeed correct when they argue that a
patent applicant is “statutorily required” under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 to
claim with particularity where his proprietary interest resides. This
section of the patent code, much like the written description
requirement of the nineteenth century,195 seeks to impose certainty and
predictability on the patent system. However, § 112, ¶ 2 cannot be
read in isolation or in an overly literal fashion because to focus solely on
the claim language when interpreting a claim is to adopt an acontextual
“plain meaning” approach to claim interpretation. The plain meaning
rule, whether applied in interpreting statutes or claims, has been widely
discredited, and its shortcomings extensively recounted.196

194. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978–79 (emphasis
added).
195. See supra note 50.
196. See, e . g . , R ICHARD A. P OSNER, T HE P ROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 296
(1990) (“[T]he central objection of the plain-meaning rule [is] meaning does not reside
simply in the words of a text, for the words are always pointing to something outside.”);
2 A N O R M A N J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY
C ONSTRUCTION § 46.02, at 91–92 (5th ed. 1992) (“The absence of intrinsic meanings
in language is an insight of semantics that has come to be widely understood and
accepted . . . . It is pertinent to recall the semantic insight that language symbols do not
have intrinsic meanings, independent of contextual considerations which influence what
people attribute to them. Even when a judge claims not to be construing a statute, he
can not help using what he has learned about customary language usage and common
understanding associated with the relevant text.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip
P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning, 42 S TAN. L. R EV. 321, 343
(1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV . L.
R EV. 405, 416–23 (1989) (discussing generally the critiques of the plain-meaning rule);
Taylor, supra note 168, at 362; Patterson, supra note 107, at 188 (“In the present era
of preoccupation with language, it is perhaps difficult to conceive how anyone could
ever have viewed language as enjoying plain meaning.”); Stanley Fish, Almost
Pragmatism: Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence, 57 U. C HI. L. R E V . 1447, 1456 (1990)
(“No act of reading can stop at the plain meaning of a document, because that meaning
itself will have emerged in the light of some stipulation of intentional circumstances,
of purpose held by agents situated in real word situations.”); Arthur L. Corbin, The
Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 C ORNELL L.Q. 161, 164
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Because “[c]laims cannot be clear and unambiguous on their
face,”197 the Federal Circuit has stated that claims must be read “in the
context of the patent.”198 It is over the interpretation of this
battleground phrase — “in the context of the patent” — that
hypertextualists and pragmatic textualists part company. When
construing claim language, each camp examines the textual
interrelationship among the claims, written description, and prosecution
history, and each attaches varying degrees of emphasis to
dictionaries.199 Indeed, this structural analysis of the intrinsic record is
essential to claim construction.200 However, the hypertextualists limit
their interpretive analysis to the intrinsic context because the patentee’s
“competitors are entitled to rely on the public record of the patent.”201
Pragmatic textualists certainly agree with this proposition, but they have
a broader view of the public record. They not only engage in a
structural analysis of the intrinsic evidence, but also consider as equally
authoritative the extrinsic context — namely, the underlying linguistic
assumptions of the relevant technological community.

(1950) (“[N]o man can determine the meaning of written words by merely glueing his
eyes with the four corners of a square paper.”).
197. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
198. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
199. The hypertextualists prefer a dictionary to expert testimony because a
dictionary is “accessible to the public in advance of litigation . . . . [Therefore a
dictionary is] to be preferred over opinion testimony, whether by an attorney or artisan
in the field of technology to which the patent is directed.”
Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In contrast, the pragmatic
textualists view a dictionary definition as “secondary to the specific meaning of a
technical term as it is used and understood in a particular technical field.” Hoechst
Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Newman, J.);
see also Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(Newman, J.) (“In judicial ‘claim construction’ the court must achieve the same
understanding of the patent, as a document whose meaning and scope have legal
consequences, as would a person experienced in the technology of the invention. Such
a person would not rely solely on a dictionary of general linguistic usage, but would
understand the claims in light of the specification and the prior art, guided by the
prosecution history and experience in the technologic field.”); cf. Cabell v. Markham,
148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) (asserting that “it is one of the surest
indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the
dictionary.”).
200. See Taylor, supra note 168, at 362 (“Structural textualism acknowledges that
words gain their meaning on the basis of their interrelations with the rest of the text.”).
201. Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716–17 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Interestingly, hypertextualists quickly point to section 112, ¶ 2 of the patent code to
support their position, yet ignore this section and other parts of the code that speak to
the central role of the artisan — i.e., sections 103 and 112, ¶ 1.
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Thus, while the intrinsic context forms the structural interpretive
foundation, contemporary hermeneutic and legal philosophy have taught
us that meaning cannot be constructed solely from the text; rather,
“meaning depends on both culture and context.”202 That is, there is an
inextricable bond between intrinsic and extrinsic context.203 The
philosopher John Searle has referred to this extrinsic context as the
“Background.”204 According to Searle:
The simplest argument for the thesis of the
Background is that the literal meaning of any sentence
can only determine its truth conditions or other
conditions of satisfaction against a Background of
capacities, dispositions, know-how, etc., which are
not themselves part of the semantic content of the
sentence. 205

202.
S U N S T E I N , s u p r a note 168, at 114; see also G. B. MADISON,
U NDERSTANDING : A P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L -P R A G M A T I C A N A L Y S I S 137 (1982)
(“Meaning is not natural but cultural, and like all other things cultural, such as social
institutions, it is not, unlike behavior, something that can be seen and thus described; it
can only be inferred from behavior.”);
R E E D D ICKERSON , T HE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF S TATUTES 103 n.2 (1975) (“. . . [P]eople can only
communicate among themselves because they share a common culture. . . .
Communication never takes place in a social vacuum, but always between individuals
who are part of a total social context.”) (quoting E. NIDA, MESSAGE AND MISSION 35,
94 (1960)).
Theodore Schatzki notes this
203. See Taylor, supra note 168, at 362–66.
interrelationship between intrinsic and extrinsic context when discussing Wittgenstein’s
use of term “language game”:
A language-game consists both of the use of a particular element
of language (word, expression, sentence, etc.) and of features of
the activities in which instances of that use are embedded . . . .
[T]he use of language is one element among many in our activities,
which themselves are embedded in a matrix of interrelated actual
and possible activities, the totality of which constitutes the form
of life in which the user of language finds himself.
Theodore R. Schatzki, The Prescription is Description: Wittgenstein’s View of the Human
Sciences, in T HE NEED FOR I N T E R P R E T A T I O N :
C ONTEMPORARY C ONCEPTIONS OF
THE P HILOSOPHER’ S T ASK 118, 126 (S. Mitchell & M. Rosen eds., 1983).
204. JOHN R. S EARLE, T HE C ONSTRUCTION OF S OCIAL R EALITY 130 (1995).
205. Id.
See also John R. Searle, The Background of Meaning, in S PEECH ACT
T HEORY AND P RAGMATICS 221 (J. Searle et al. eds. 1980) (“[T]he meaning of a
sentence only has application (it only, for example, determines a set of truth
conditions) against a background of assumptions and practices that are not representable
as a part of the meaning.”); JOHN R. S EARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING 117–36
(1979) (arguing that meaning is dependent on context); S TANLEY F ISH , IS T HERE A
T EXT IN T HIS C LASS?
T HE AU T H O R I T Y O F INTERPRETIVE C OMMUNITIES (1980)
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Indeed, several other notable thinkers such as Karl Llewellyn,206
Richard Posner,207 Pierre Bourdieu, 208 Cass Sunstein,209 and Stanley
Fish210 have expressed the importance of culture and extrinsic context
in discerning meaning. Perhaps the most influential figure to do so was
Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations. 21 1
Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian philosophy (after 1929) eschewed the
demand for Platonic certainty and a unified theory of language and
posited that language is best understood as a labyrinth of interconnected
practices.212 That is, the diversity and plurality of language make it

(asserting that what people call a literal meaning is merely the assumed, generally
understood, implicit context).
206. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, T HE C OMMON LAW T RADITIO N : DECIDING
APPEALS 268–85 (1960) (discussing what he referred to as “ situation sense”);
Wiseman, supra note 107, at 505 (stating that Llewellyn sought “to codify the
common practices and understandings of the marketplace. The rule relating to trade
usage is one example: it simply provided that the usage of trade, or of a particular trade,
is ‘presumed to be the background which the parties have presupposed in their bargaining
and have intended to read into the particular contract’”); Patterson, supra note 107, at
206 (“Llewellyn was concerned with the relationship between words and the activities
of which they are a part.”).
207. See, e.g., P OSNER, supra note 1, at 174 (“To read a case, to read a statute, a
rule, or a constitutional clause presupposes a vast linguistic, cultural, and conceptual
apparatus.”); R ICHARD A. P OSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 220 (1988) (“Words have
reliable meaning only by virtue of their location in a sentence or larger verbal structure
and often in a social practice as well.”); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. R ES. L.
R EV. 179, 191 (1987) ( “ A text is clear only by virtue of linguistic and cultural
competence.”).
208. See, e.g., P IERRE B OURDIE U, OUTLINE OF A T HEORY OF P RACTICE 72–95
(Richard Nice trans., 1977) (discussing the “habitus”). Searle notes that, “if I understand
him correctly, Pierre Bourdieu’s important work on the ‘habitus’ is about the same sort
of phenomena that I call the Background.” SEARLE, supra note 204, at 132.
209. See, e.g., S UNSTEIN, supra note 168, at 114 (“[W]ords are not self-defining.
. . . They derive meaning from context and their background in the relevant culture.”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. C H I . L. R EV. 1247, 1247 (1990) (“The
meaning of any ‘text’ is a function not of the bare words, but of its context and the
relevant culture.”).
210. See, e.g., S TANLEY F ISH , DOING W HAT C OMES NATURALLY (1989).
211. W ITTGENSTEIN, supra note 42; see also Phillip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired
By My Critics, 72 T EX. L. R EV. 1869, 1948–49 (1994) (assert ing that “drawing
attention” to the relationship between social context and meaning “is the achievement
for which [Wittgenstein] is best known to the public”). For a general discussion of
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and the law, see W ITTGENSTEIN AND LEGAL T HEORY
(Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1992).
212. See generally R OBERT J . A CKERMAN, W ITTGENSTEIN’ S C ITY, at 47–66
(1988); see also Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. R EV.
1467, 1477 (1996) (“Wittgenstein’s principal insight is that the meaning of words is
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impossible to discern a universal linguistic algorithm.213
For
Wittgenstein, the “philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a
primitive idea of the way language functions.”214 This notion is nicely
illustrated by Wittgenstein’s “five red apples” example found in his
Philosophical Investigations:
I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked
“five red apples”. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper,
who opens the drawer marked “apples”; then he looks
up the word “red” in a table and finds a colour sample
opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers
— I assume that he knows them by heart — up to the
word “five” and for each number he takes an apple of
the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. — It
is in this and similar ways that one operates with
words. — “But how does he know where and how is
he to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with
the word ‘five’?” — Well, I assume that he acts as I
have described. Explanations come to an end
somewhere. — But what is the meaning of the word
“five”? — No such thing was in question here, only
how the word “five” is used.215

not an inherent property of platonic or ‘natural’ concepts.”).
213. See H I L A R Y P U T N A M, R EPRESENTATION AND R E A L I T Y 114 (1988)
(“[W]hat is (by commonsense standards) the same situation can be described in many
different ways, depending on how we use the words.”).
214. W ITTGENSTEIN, supra note 42, § 2.
215. I d . at § 1. In discussing the importance of the “Background” in determining
“truth conditions” of sentences, Professor Searle provides the following example:
Think, for example, of the occurrence of the word “cut” in
sentences such as “Sally cut the cake” or “Bill cut the grass” or
“ The tailor cut the cloth”; or think of the verb “grow” in
sentences such as “The American economy is growing” or “My
son is growing” or “The grass is growing.” In a normal literal
utterance of each of these sentences, each verb has a constant
meaning.
There is no lexical ambiguity or metaphorical usage
involved. But in each case the same verb will determine different
truth conditions of satisfaction generally, because what counts as
cutting or growing will vary with the context. If you consider the
sentence “Cut the grass!” you know that this is to be interpreted
differently from “Cut the cake!” If somebody tells me to cut the
cake and I run over it with a lawn mower or they tell me to cut the
grass and I rush and stab it with a knife, there is a very ordinary
sense in which I did not do what I was told to do. Yet nothing in
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This example conveys Wittgenstein’s belief that “the teaching of
language is not explanation, but training.”216 As Professors Baker and
Hacker state, “[t]he meaning of a word is given by specification of its
use,”217 that is, by observing the activities in which the shopkeeper is
engaged.218 In essence, Wittgenstein views these activities as the
grammar of ideas, a grammar possessing certain conventions. He
refers to this dynamic as a “language-game,”219 whereby “the speaking
of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”220 To understand

the literal meaning of those sentences blocks those wrong
interpretations.
In each case we understand the verb differently,
even though its literal meaning is constant, because in each case
our interpretation depends on our Background abilities.
S EARLE, supra note 204, at 130–31.
See also DENNIS M. P ATTERSON, LAW AND
T RUTH 87 (1996) (“The criterion for understanding an utterance is not engagement of
a process; rather, it is acting appropriately in response to the utterance. For example,
one evinces understanding of the request ‘Please pass the salt’ by passing the salt or by
explaining why it is impossible to do so.”).
216. W ITTGENSTEIN, supra note 42, § 5; see also G.P. B AKER & P.M.S. HACKER,
W ITTGENSTEIN: UNDERSTANDING AND M EANING 71 (1980) (“Language must speak
for itself.
Consequently, grammatical explanations presuppose a background of prior
understanding, a partial linguistic competence.
With language-learners, such as we,
explanation has a pedagogical role only after brute training has laid the foundation of
elementary linguistic skills.”).
217. B AKER & HACKER, supra note 216, at 63; see also Dennis M. Patterson,
Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement
Under Article Nine, 137 U. P A. L. R E V . 335, 355 (“The centerpiece of Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy is the doctrine of ‘meaning as use.’”).
218. Professors Baker and Hacker offer the following explanation of the “five red
apples” example:
Each of the three words in ‘five red apples’ has a different use, and
this can be described without answering questions such as ‘What is
the meaning of the word “five”?’ — where ‘meaning’ is thought
to be given by specification of an entity.
Of course,
[Wittgenstein’s] point is that there is nothing left to say about the
meaning of ‘five’ (properly understood) after its use has been
described.
B AKER & HACKER, supra note 216, at 63.
219. W ITTGENST EIN, supra note 42, § 7. Wittgenstein states, “I shall also call the
whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the ‘languagegame.’”
Id.
By using the term “language-game,” Wittgenstein is suggesting that
meaning is discerned from examining the interrelationship between language and its
contextual setting.
See Schatzki, supra note 203, at 1 2 6 ; see also H.L. F INCH ,
W ITTGENSTEIN 44–45 (1995).
220. W ITTGE NSTEIN, supra note 42, § 23; see also S. HILMY, T HE LATER
W ITTGENSTEIN 163 (1987) (“One of the senses of the German word Leben is in the
fact ‘activity’, and quite obviously the ‘life’ of which Wittgenstein is speaking here is
the linguistic activity or locus of linguistic practice . . . .”).
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an idea, one must examine the activities that are part of the idea. 221
Observing the application of words in action (i.e., activities), and not
their origin, leads to understanding.222 As Professor Dennis Patterson
explains, for Wittgenstein, “[a]ll understanding begins in language, but
to understand the grammar of a concept one needs to investigate the
point(s) the concept serves in social practices (the activities into which
it is woven), which practices must themselves be the focus of attention
in any investigation of meaning.”223
Wittgenstein’s approach to language informs us as to how words
in a legal text are meaningful. By working within the text itself and
participating in the activities associated therewith, one does not interpret
the words in the text by focusing on the subjective intent of the author
or by gazing through a mediating lens. Rather, meaning is discerned by
examining the social practices in which these words are used.224
The insights of Wittgenstein and Searle are applicable to pragmatic
textualism. Contrary to the assertion of some scholars,225 textualism,

221. Baker and Hacker state that two of the most important features of
Wittgenstein’s language-games are “context” and “activity of the game.” With respect
to the former, they write:
Like any other game, a language-game is ‘played’ in a setting.
Wittgenstein’s stress on the context of the game appears to be
motivated by the wish to bring to the fore elements of linguistic
activities which, while not obviously involved in the explanation
of the meaning of constituent expressions[,] . . . are nevertheless
pertinent to their meaning.
At its most general the notion of
context encompasses the presuppositions of meaning.
If the
context were significantly different, the game would not be played,
for it would be pointless.
B AKER & HACKER, supra note 216, at 96.
222. For Wittgenstein, study of the language-games “disperses the fog” so that one
can “study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which one
can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words.” WITTGENSTEIN,
supra note 42, § 5.
223. Patterson, supra note 217, at 363; see also F INCH , s u p r a note 219, at 44
(“Grammatical remarks . . . are binding norms of language . . . . In them . . . we see the
meanings of a culture.”).
224. See W ITTGENSTEIN, supra note 42, §§ 241–42; see also P OSNER, supra note
196, at 297 (“Much communication is tacit — a matter of shared practices — so you
must understand an entire culture in order to be able to understand its writings.”); Brian
A. Langille, Revolution Without Foundation: The Grammar of Scepticism and Law, 33
MCGILL L.J. 451, 488 (1988) (asserting that the “central message” of Philosophical
Investigations “is the idea of language as an activity (not a mental process)”).
225. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 34 (asserting that for textualists, “the
beginning, and usually the end, of statutory interpretation should be the apparent
meaning of the statutory language”); Bell, supra note 2, at 60 (critics of textualism
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particularly what I refer to as pragmatic textualism, is not wedded
solely to the text.226 Indeed, many textualists understand that “the
meaning of a word is its use in the language”227 — a public language

contend that since words have no inherent meaning outside their context, “heavy
reliance on text to interpret statutes will produce unreasonable, stilted, and erroneous
interpretations of statutes. Words have meaning only within the context in which they
are used, and thus context must be considered in interpreting statutory text.”).
226. See Manning, supra note 2, at 696 (“Not even the most committed t e x t u a l i s t
would claim that statutory texts are inherently ‘plain on their face,’ or that all
interpretation takes place within the four corners of the Statutes at Large.”); Daniel A.
Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law,
45 VAND. L. R EV. 533, 546 (1992) (“To deride [textualism] as mindless literalism
would clearly be a mistake. On the contrary, Justice Scalia’s approach extends beyond
the dictionary meaning of the phrase in dispute to include a fairly rich array of other
factors.”).
227. W ITTGENSTEIN, supra note 42, § 4 3 ; see also Easterbrook, supra note 13, at
64 (“Because interpretation is a social enterprise, because words have no natural
meanings, and because their effect lies in context, we must consult these contexts.”);
Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 W ASH . U. L. R EV. 1085, 1093 (1995)
(“[A]lthough the new textualism is sometimes condemned for reliance upon ridiculous
assumptions about texts having acontextual meaning, the more sophisticated
practitioners of that craft are innocent of any such crime.”); Karkkainen, supra note
41, at 412 (“For Justice Scalia, statutory interpretation is not purely textually-driven.
Instead, interpretation may require an evaluation of the statute’s policy and purpose,
which are determined in large measure by the factual circumstances and institutional
arrangements that form the background against which the statute was enacted.”);
Merrill, supra note 91, at 351–52 (“Textualism is not simply a revival of the old plain
meaning rule. It is a sophisticated theory of interpretation which readily acknowledges
that the meaning of words depends on the context in which they are used.”); Antonin
Scalia, Is There an Unwritten Constitution?, 12 HARV . J.L. & P UB. P OL’ Y 1, 1 (1989)
(asserting that an “ unwritten Constitution . . . encompasses a whole history of meaning
. . . .”).
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replete with underlying assumptions.228 As noted by Judge Frank
Easterbrook,
Wittgenstein showed that no system of language can
be self-contained and that meaning thus must depend
in part on logical structure and understandings
supplied by a community of readers, but this does not
establish that words contain no meaning or that judges
may disregard such meaning as most readers would
find. There is no “private language”; meaning lies in
shared reactions to text. If readers have a common
understanding of structure they may decipher meaning
accurately.229
This language indicates that Judge Easterbrook subscribes to the
“community consensus” view 230 of Wittgenstein that has its

228. Professors Baker & Hacker explain this “contextualism” as follows:
A sentence is akin to a move in chess, and a move is only a move
in the context of a game. So even a sentence has no meaning in
isolation.
Understanding a language is the background against
which a sentence acquires meaning, as understanding chess is for a
move. A sentence is a position in the “game of language,” hence
to understand a sentence is to understand a language.
Thus
interpreted, the contextual dictum is directly connected with use.
It is connected with structure only in so far as structure reflects
use.
B AKER & HACKER, supra note 216, at 280; see also MICHAEL J. OAKESHOTT,
Political Education, in R A T I O N A L I S M I N P OLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 111, 129
(1962) (“We do not begin to learn our native language by learning the alphabet, or by
learning its grammar; we do not begin by learning words, but words in use.”); C.K.
OGDEN & I.A. R ICHARDS, T HE MEANING OF MEANING 9–10 (1923) (“Words, as
every one now knows, ‘mean’ nothing by themselves . . . . It is only when a thinker
makes use of them that they stand for anything, or, in one sense, have ‘meaning.’”);
T HOMAS MORAWETZ, W ITTGENSTEIN AND K N O W L E D G E 5–33 (1978) (discussing
Wittgenstein’s notion of practice).
229. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domain, 50 U. C HI. L. R EV. 533, 533 n.2
(1983); see also In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (“An unadorned
‘plain meaning’ approach to interpretation supposes that words have meanings divorced
from their contexts—linguistic, structural, functional, social, historical. Language is a
process of communication that works only when authors and readers share a set of rules
and meanings.”); Continental Can Co., v. Chicago Truck Drivers Pension Fund, 916
F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) (“You don’t have to be Ludwig Wittgenstein or HansGeorg Gadamer to know that successful communication depends on meanings shared by
interpretive communities.”).
230. See NORMAN MALCOLM, NOTHING IS HIDDEN 156 (1986).
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underpinning in section 202 of the Investigations: “‘[O]beying a rule’
is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule.
Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one
was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.”231 Thus,
given Judge Easterbrook’s remark that “meaning lies in shared reactions
to text,”232 he would likely concur with Norman Malcolm that “for
Wittgenstein the concept of a rule presupposes a community within
which a common agreement in actions fixes the meaning of a rule.”233
B. Pragmatic Textualism and the Useful Arts
1. The Centrality of the Artisan
Upon reading Federal Circuit opinions written by both
hypertextualists and pragmatic textualists, one reads time and again that
“the focus in construing disputed terms in claim language is . . . on the
objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention would have understood the term to mean.”234 Despite this
language, the hypertextualist judge takes an expansive view of judicial
power and positions himself as both judge and artisan. Yet, without the
assistance of a skilled artisan, how can the hypertextualist live up to the

When Wittgenstein says that following a rule is a practice, I think he means
that a person’s actions cannot be in accord with a rule unless they are in
conformity with a common way of acting that is displayed in the behaviour
of nearly everyone who has had the same training.
This means that the
concept of following a rule implies the concept of a community of rulefollowers.”
Id.; see also Dennis M. Patter s o n , Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice and Narrative
76 VA. L. R EV. 937, 939 (1990).
231. W ITTGENSTEIN, supra note 42, § 202.
232. Easterbrook, supra note 229, at 533 n.2.
233. MALCOLM, supra note 230, at 175; see also Christopher Peacocke, Reply:
Rule Following: The Nature of Wittgenstein’s Arguments, in W ITTGENSTEIN, T O
F OLLOW A R ULE 73 (Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich eds. 1981)
(“[W]hat is it for a person to be following a rule, even individually, cannot ultimately
be explained without reference to some community.”); S AUL A. KRIP K E ,
W ITTGENSTEIN ON R ULES AND P RIVATE LANGUAGE 7–10 (1982).
234. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir.
1995); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose
eyes the claims are construed.”); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd., 78 F.3d
1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A technical term used in a patent document is interpreted
as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the
invention . . . .”).
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promise of Markman I to “arrive at the true and consistent scope of the
patent owner’s rights?”235
What is meant by the words “true” and “objective”? Is the
hypertextualist judge endorsing a correspondence theory of truth? 2 3 6
This would be particularly bold (especially for an appellate judge)
because, as Richard Rorty has asserted, it is “impossible . . . to step
outside our skins — the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we
do our thinking and self-criticism — and compare ourselves with
something absolute.”237 The more plausible meaning of the words
“true” and “objective” is, as a pragmatic textualist would assert, that
which is “capable of commanding agreement among all members of a
group subscribing to common principles.”238 As such, only patent
law’s PHOSITA is positioned to provide the technical knowledge that
is needed to arrive at a meaning consistent with how the disputed claim
language is understood in the germane technological community. This
is why the characterization of claim construction as a question of law
subject to de novo review is a fiction.
A hypertextualist’s approach does not look to see how the claim
language is used in practice; rather, it may choose a meaning proffered
by one of the parties or a construction in accord with the judge’s

235. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
236. The correspondence theory of truth holds that a statement is true if the
statement corresponds with the way the world is; that is, the statement corresponds to
an objective reality. See T HE OXFORD C OMP A N I O N T O P HILOSOPHY 166–67 (1995);
see also MORTIMER J. ADLER, S IX GREAT I D E A S 42 (1981) (“[T]he truth of thought
consists in the agreement or correspondence between what one thinks, believes, or
opines and what actually exists or does not exist in the reality that is independent of our
minds and of our thinking one thing or another.”); Kenneth J. Kress, Why No Judge
Should Be a Dworkian Coherentist, 77 T EX. L. R EV. 1375, 1380 (1999)
(“Correspondence theories of truth evoke the image of true propositions mirroring
reality.”).
237. R O R T Y , s u p r a note 1, at xix; see also P OSNER, supra note 1, 205, at 18
(asserting that nobody “ knows the way thing s really are”); HILARY P UTNAM, R EASON,
T RUTH, AN D H I S T O R Y 50 (1981) (arguing that under an “internalist perspective,”
truth is “not correspondence with mind-independent or discourse-independent ‘states
of affairs.’ There is no God’s Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine”).
238. P OSNER, supra note 1, at 1 8 ; s ee also P UTNAM, supra note 213, at 115
(“[W]e can explain what ‘correct to use the words of which the statement consists in
that way’ means by saying that it means nothing more nor less than a sufficiently well
placed speaker who used the words in that way would by fully warranted in counting the
statement as true of that situation.”); W ILLIAM JAMES, Pragmatism, in P RAGMATISM
AND F OUR ESSAYS FROM T HE MEANING OF T RUTH 59 (1955) (“The true is the
name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief . . . .”).
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background assumptions.239 In contrast, the pragmatic textualist judge
understands that there are normative components or rules in the
institutional structure of each technological field, and judges are simply
too far removed from this structure to develop a set of background
assumptions essential to discerning the “true” and “objective” meaning
of claim language. 240 As Judge Easterbrook wrote, “What seems clear
to a judge may read otherwise to a skilled designer.”241 This
understanding sanctions the notion that “context encompasses the
presuppositions of meaning,”242 and recognizes that the artisan “has
developed a set of capacities and abilities that render him at home in [his
technological] society.”243

239. See, e.g., Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir.
1995); see al s o Douglas Y’Barbo, Is Extrinsic Evidence Ever Necessary to Resolve Claim
Construction Disputes?, 81 J. P AT. & T RADEMARK OFF. S OC’ Y, 567, 573 (1999)
(“The Markman Court resolved the dispute not by asking what the term actually meant
— but instead by checking each of the two proffered conjectures against the text and
eliminating the one that fails to preserve the text’s internal coherence.”).
As a matter of doctrine, this approach disregards the fact that the “inventor, for
purposes of legal reasoning, has been replaced . . . by the statutory hypothetical ‘person
having ordinary skill in the art’ . . . .” Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,
Inc., 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted); see also Standard Oil
Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985), wherein the court
stated:
The statutory emphasis is on a person of ordinary skill.
Inventors, as a class, according to the concepts underlying the
Constitution and the statutes that have created the patent system,
possess something — call it what you will — which sets them apart
from the workers of ordinary skill, and one should not go about
determining obviousness under § 103 by inquiring into what
patentees (i.e., inventors) would have known or would likely have
done, faced with the revelation of references.
240. See S EARLE, supra note 204, at 145–47 ; see also B AKER & HACKER, supra
note 216, at 93 (“The foundation of the ability to play a game lies in training; the
ability to play it is mastery of a technique. Playing games is a human activity, and its
existence presupposes common reactions, propensities, and abilities.”).
241. In re Mahurkar Double Lumen, 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation).
242. B AKER & HACKER, supra note 216, at 96.
243. S EARLE, supra note 204, at 147. According to Posner:
[A]lmost everyone . . . would . . . admit that the experimental,
statistical, predictive, and observational procedures of modern
science, together with the technical capability of embodying and
thereby testing scientific theories in technology . . . enable many
scientific ideas to be reasonably held with a degree of confidence
. . . that enables them to be called ‘true’ without a sense of strain,
rather than merely convenient to believe.
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Indeed, just as a legislator “must operate within the prevailing
interpretive culture,”244 the skilled artisan has knowledge of the
underlying background assumptions and linguistic customs within his
technological community.245 When the hypertextualists assert that
competitors of the patentee should “rest assured . . . that a judge,
trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the patent and its
associated public record and apply the established rules of construction”
to arrive at the true scope of the patent grant, they ignore the cultural
divide between judge and artisan.246 Given the exclusion of extrinsic
evidence, the phrase “similarly analyze the text” seems to suggest that
the hypertextualist judge is asking the artisan to engage in an interpretive
paradigm shift and think (counterintuitively) like a judge and “apply
established rules of construction,” rather than, as the patent code
requires, the judge think like an artisan and familiarize himself with the
artisan’s communal norms.247 Thus, hypertextualism greatly increases
what we might refer to as the artisan’s interpretation costs.248
The late Judge Nies, in discussing the distinction between the
phrases “in the prior art” and “from the prior art” when determining
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, noted the relevance of the artisan’s
background assumptions:

P OSNER, supra note 1, at 36.
244. S UNSTEIN, supra note 168, at 114.
245. See Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (patent law’s artisan “is deemed to read the words used in the patent
documents with an understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have knowledge
of any special meaning and usage in the field.”); In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 1403
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The board attributes to the ‘hypothetical person’ knowledge of all
prior art in the field of the inventor’s endeavor and prior art solutions for a common
problem even if outside that field. That view accords with the plethora of this court’s
precedent.”); Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1025 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“In evaluating obviousness, the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art is presumed to have the ‘ability to select and utilize knowledge from other
arts reasonably pertinent to [the] particular problem’ to which the invention is
directed.”) (quoting In re Antle, 444 F.2d 1168, 1171–72 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
246. In a concurring opinion shortly after Markman I was decided, Judge Mayer, after
noting the “artificiality” of Markman I, stated, “How [Markman I] fosters greater
predictability and consistency in the law or a certainty that a judge will “arrive at the
true and consistent scope of the patent owner’s rights” is beyond my understanding.”
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J.,
concurring).
247. See Cybor. v. FAS Techs., Inc. , 138 F.3d 1448, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader,
J., dissenting) (asserting that by embracing de novo review and excluding extrinsic
evidence, the majority “has sub silentio redefined the claim construction inquiry as ‘how
a lawyer or judge would interpret the term’”).
248. I am grateful to Thomas Cotter for this point.
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The word “from” expresses the idea of the statute that
we must look at the obviousness issue through the
eyes of one of ordinary skill in the art and what one
would be presumed to know with that background.
What would be obvious to one of skill in the art is a
different question from what would be obvious to a
layman. An artisan is likely to extract more than a
layman from reading a reference.
. . . [A] suggestion or motivation to combine prior art
teachings can derive solely from the existence of a
teaching, which one of ordinary skill in the art would
be presumed to know, and the use of that teaching to
solve the same or similar problem which it
addresses.249
Although § 112, ¶ 2 requires the patent applicant to claim his invention
with particularity, the meaning of claim language is derived from
extrinsic contextual sources — namely, the technological community
and the customs to which the invention pertains.250 Thus, the extrinsic
evidence is as much a part of the public record as is intrinsic evidence.
This inextricable link between intrinsic and extrinsic context is reflected
in several provisions of the patent code that place the PHOSITA at
center stage. For example, two of arguably the most important sections
of the patent code require that to be patentable, the claimed invention
must not be “obvious” to a “person having ordinary skill in the art,”251
and must “enable” a “person skilled in the art” to make and use the
claimed invention.252

249. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
250. The Supreme Court expressed this sentiment nearly 140 years ago in Bischoff
v. Wethered, 76 U.S. 812 (1869):
[T]he whole subject-matter of a patent is an embodied concept
outside of the patent itself . . . . This outward embodiment of the
terms contained in the patent is the thing invented, and i s t o b e
properly sought, like the explanation of all latent ambiguities
arising from the description of external things, by evidence in pais.
Id. at 815; see also Toro v. White Consol., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Newman, J.)
(“Determining the limits of a patent claim requires understanding its terms in the
context in which they were used by the inventor, considered by the examiner, and
understood in the field of the invention.”); C ORBIN, supra note 86, § 555 (“[U]sages
and customs are a part of those circumstances by which the meaning of words is to be
judged.”).
251. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994).
252. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994); see also, Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-

60

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 14

The hypertextualist philosophy relies too heavily on the power of
the word to convey meaning with clarity. In patent law, as in any area
of the law, the communicative force of the written word has its limits,
and these inherent limitations do not discriminate between technical and
non-technical terms. Take the example of the oft-used claim words
“substantially equal to,” “closely approximate,” or “close to.” These
non-technical terms are ambiguous when viewed acontextually. Yet the
Federal Circuit has recognized their importance in claim drafting,253
stating that their “acceptability depends on ‘whether one of ordinary
skill in the art would understand what is claimed.’”254 In short, only by
turning to technological custom and culture can we understand claim
meaning.
Therefore, the phrase “claim interpretation” is a misnomer. 255
Understanding the meaning of claim language usually does not entail
interpretation;256 rather, understanding the meaning of claim language is

Ford Co., 894 F.Supp. 844, 858 (“The patent laws focus the requirements of the
information that must appear in each patent and its claims on those skilled in the art.”).
The Federal Circuit, as part of its common law, has developed various tests that are
satisfied (or not) from the perspective of the artisan.
See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that to satisfy the “written
description” requirement, the applicant must “reasonably convey[] to the artisan that
the inventor had possession” of the claimed invention as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112).
253. See Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1546–47
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elecs., Inc., 847 F.2d 819, 821 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (Newman, J.).
254. Andrew, 847 F.2d at 821 (quoting Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating &
Packaging, 731 F.2d 819, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
255. I use the word “interpretation” here to mean making a choice between two or
more communally accepted meanings of the claim language in question.
See
P ATTERSON, supra note 215, at 86 (“Interpretation in law involves a decision about
how, from among several candidates, one chooses whether to extend a rule one way
rather than another.
Interpretation becomes necessary only when some real doubt
exists about how to apply a rule.”); P OSNER, supra note 196, at 460 (“The essence of
interpretive decision making is considering the consequences of alternative decisions.”).
256. See W I T T G E N S T E I N , supra note 42, § 201 (“[T]here is a way of grasping a rule
which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’
and ‘going against it’ in actual cases . . . . [T]here is an inclination to say: every action
according to the rule is an interpretation.
But we ought to restrict the term
‘interpretation’ to substitution of one expression of the rule for another.”);
P ATTERSON, supra note 215, at 71–98. According to Searle:
I am reluctant to use the word ‘interpretation’ because it suggests
something that is definitely false. The use of this word suggests
t hat there is an act of interpreting whenever we understand
something or perceive something, and of course I don’t want to
say that.
I want to say we normally just see an object or
understand a sentence, without any act of interpreting.
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a result of understanding how the language is used in practice. 257 In
fact, Judge Newman has noted the importance of ascertaining “the
specific meaning of a technical term as it is used and understood in a
particular technical field.”258 The artisan can be viewed as part of a
technological community within which there is common agreement on
the meaning of the disputed claim language. 259 Indeed, agreement is
more likely in a scientific community (as opposed to, say, a literary
community) where statistical and experimental procedures “enable
many scientific ideas to be reasonably held with a degree of confidence
. . . that enables them to be called ‘true’ without a sense of strain, rather
than merely convenient to believe.”260 Indeed, the patent code requires

S EARLE, supra note 204, at 134.
257. See W ITTGENSTEIN, supra note 42, § 202 (“‘Obeying a rule’ is a practice.
And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule.”). According to Patterson:
If all understanding were interpretation, then each interpretation
would itself stand in need of interpretation, and so on, infinitely
regressing to infinity.
This logical problem, one long ago
recognized, suggests that there is something deeply wrong with
assigning to interpretation a mediating role between utterances and
the understanding of them.
The only way out of this vicious
regress is to recognize that the normativity of rule-guided behavior
(e.g., law) lies not in the act of the individual (e.g., interpretation)
but in a practice.
P ATTERSON, supra note 215, at 88.
258. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems., Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (Newman, J.).
259. See T HOMAS, supra note 4, at 185 n.6 (asserting that “we can at least
acknowledge that the patent professionals form an interpretive community”);
P UTNAM , supra note 237, at 52 (asserting that “signs do not intrinsically correspond
to objects, independently of how those signs are employed and by whom. But a sign that
is actually employed in a particular way by a particular community of users can
correspond to particular objects within the conceptual scheme of those users.”); see also
W ITTGEN S T E I N , s u p r a note 42, § 198 (“Interpretations by themselves do not
determine meaning . . . . [A] person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a
regular use of sign-posts, a custom.”); MALCOLM, supra not e 2 3 0 , at 173
(“Wittgenstein stresses the point that a language can exist only if there is agreement
between persons in their applications of the language.”).
260. P O SNER, supra note 1, 205, at 36; see also JOHN DEWEY, T HE QUEST F O R
C ERTAINTY 310–11 (1960). As the well-known physicist Steven Weinberg has noted,
“[m]eanings do change, but generally they do so in the direction of an increased richness
and precision of definition, so that we do not lose the ability to understand the theories
of past periods of normal science.” Steven Weinberg, The Revolution That Didn’t
Happen, in T HE NEW YORK R EVIEW OF B OOKS 48, 49 (October 8, 1998). Thus, for
Weinberg, scientific progress represents a “cumulative approach to truth.” Id. at 50.
The “neo-pragmatists,” such as Rorty, have expressed a more skeptical attitude toward
science — certainly more so than Dewey — and have asserted that there is nothing
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that the operability of the claimed invention be testable and directly
observable. 261
Patent law, perhaps more than any other area of the law, provides
the judge with access to the scientific method and the “prediction” and
“control” that accompany it.262 However, the hypertextualist judge
ignores this direct pipeline to the technological community and chooses
instead to engage in a de novo, acontextual interpretive analysis through

distinctive about the scientific method. See Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism
and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. C AL. L. R EV. 1811, 1813 (1990) (“[W]e have all read
Kuhn, Hanson, Toulmin, and Feyerabend, and have thereby become suspicious of the
term ‘scientific method.’”).
Indeed, Posner is quick to recognize that pragmatism has
shifted “the emphasis in the philosophy of science from the discovery of nature’s laws
by observation to the formulation of theories about nature.” P OSNER, supra note 1,
at 464.
After the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s groundbreaking The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, it became explicit “that scientific theories are a function of
human need and desire rather than of the way things are in nature.” Id. However,
according to Posner, “[t]his need not make the pragmatist unfriendly to science.” Id.
As Brian Tamanaha writes:
This objection [i.e., that there is nothing distinctive about the
scientific method] is devastating only if Dewey and James did see
the scientific method as something distinct . . . . The essence of
the method lies in an attitude which involves detached and
impartial inquiry (which does not rule out having an opinion based
on faith or insight to guide the inquiry), close attention to the
facts, and experimentation and testing . . . . So the issue is not
whether the method of inquiry proposed by Dewey and James is
uniquely scientific, but whether it is useful and productive in the
accumulation of knowledge. On that score there can be no doubt.
Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative
Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. JURIS.
315, 352–53 (1996); see also Susan Haack, Pragmatism, in T HE B LACKWELL
C OMPANION TO P HILOSOPHY 643 (1996). According to Haack:
Rorty appeals to Dewey’s repudiation of the epistemological
tradition.
But the appeal is strained, for Dewey looks to the
‘naturalization of intelligence,’ to a scientific approach to replace
the ‘spectator theory of knowledge,’ while Rorty declares that
epistemology needs no successor-subject, and, far from welcoming
a shift towards science, anticipates the future of post-philosophy
as a genre of literature or of literary criticism.
Id. at 654.
261. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112.
262. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Science in the Courtroom, ISSUES IN S CIENCE AND
T ECHNOLOGY 52 (Summer 2000) (“The legal disputes before us increasingly involve
the principles and tools of science. Proper resolution of those disputes matters not just
to the litigants, but also to the general public — those who live in our technologically
complex society and whom the law must serve.”).
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a mediating lens.263 This approach, adopted in Markman I and affirmed
in Cybor, ineluctably leads to an opportunity for judges to entertain their
own background assumptions and biases,264 which are themselves a
form of extrinsic evidence. Indeed, instead of an exercise in exegesis
when construing a claim, the hypertextualist delivers eisegesis. As
Arthur Corbin noted:
[N]o relevant credible evidence is inadmissible merely
because it is extrinsic; all such evidence is extrinsic.
When a court makes the often repeated statement that
the written words are so plain and clear and
unambiguous that they need no interpretation and that
evidence is not admis sible, it is making an
interpretation on the sole basis of the extrinsic
evidence of its own linguistic experiences and

263. Even if we were to accept an antifoundationalist view of science, the scientific
method would still provide greater exactitude and reflect, at least as of the moment, the
beliefs of those who matter most — the artisans who rely and build upon extant
patented technology. The reason there is usually a commonly held view within a
technical community is because of the scientific method. As Posner writes:
What is missing from law are penetrating and rigorous theories,
counterintuitive hypotheses that are falsifiable but not falsified
(and so are at least tentatively supported), precise instrumentation,
an exact vocabulary, a clear separation of positive and normative
inquiry, quantification of data, credible controlled experiments,
rigorous statistical inference, useful technological byproducts,
dramatic interventions with measurable consequences, and above
all and subsuming most of the previous points, objectivity testable
— and continually retested — hypotheses.
P OSNER , supra note 196, at 69.
In addressing Thomas Kuhn’s incommensurability
argument (that is, the argument that as scientific paradigms shift, the standards by which
scientific theories are judged also changes), Weinberg states that while “[o]ur ideas have
changed, . . . we have continued to assess our theories in pretty much the same way: a
theory is taken as a success if it is based on simple general principles and does a good job
of accounting for experimental data in a natural way.” Weinberg, supra note 260, at
50. In the end, “[w]hat drives us onward in the work of science is precisely that there
are truths out there to be discovered that once discovered will form a permanent part
of human knowledge.” Id.
264. See K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader,
J., dissenting) (“When judges intuit an ordinary and accustomed meaning divorced from
context, they are (usually unwittingly) imposing their own subjective linguistic values
on a public decision.”); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (Rader, J., dissenting) (asserting that by embracing de novo review and excluding
extrinsic context, the Cybor majority “has sub silentio redefined the claim construction
inquiry as ‘how a lawyer or judge would interpret the term’”).
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education, of which it merely takes judicial notice. 265
As of late, the pragmatic textualist’s response to hypertextualism’s
disregard of the artisan and his community’s underlying assumptions
has been more pronounced and candid. For instance, in K-2 Corp. v.
Salomon S.A., 266 Judge Rader, in a dissenting opinion, criticized the
majority for not considering technological or extrinsic context in its
claim interpretation analysis.267 The patent related to in-line roller skates,
and the disputed claim term was “permanently affixed.”268 According
to Judge Rader, the majority, while stating that “claim construction is
firmly anchored in reality by the understanding of those of ordinary skill
in the art,”269 proceeded to interpret the claim without exploring the
underlying assumptions or context of in-line skating technology:
[T]his court does not even consider the meaning an
ordinary in-line skate artisan would attach to
“permanently.” . . .
Divorced from context, words lose their ordinary
and accustomed meanings. “Permanent” in the
context of mountain ranges can mean millennia;
“permanent” in the context of hair treatments can
mean until the next rain storm; “permanent” in the
context of creased pants can mean until the next long
airline trip in coach class; “permanent” in the context
of genetic combinations can mean until the next
mutation. When judges intuit an ordinary and
accustomed meaning divorced from context, they are
(usually unwittingly) imposing their own subjective
linguistic values on a public decision.
As this court verbally recognizes but substantively
ignores, the understanding of one of ordinary skill in
the art sets the proper context for the meaning of
claim terms.270

265. Corbin, supra note 196, at 189 (emphasis added).
266. 191 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
267. See id. at 1370–71.
268. Id. at 1360.
269. Id. at 1365.
270. Id. at 1370; see also Judge Rader’s comments in Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. HewlettPackard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader, J., additional views),
wherein he stated:
Vitronics offers good counsel when it urges trial judges to focus on
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Thus, much like Corbin’s and Llewellyn’s emphasis on custom and
trade usage in response to the Willistonian or classical contract model,
the pragmatic textualists on the Federal Circuit understand that meaning
is derived from asking how persons of ordinary skill in the art
understand the claim language in question. The virtues of predictability
and certainty are achieved (or, at least, realized to a greater extent than
they would be under a hypertextualist approach) because technical
terms, through custom, training, and the cumulative nature of complex
technology, have acquired a common meaning that is shared by the
artisans of the relevant technological community.271 Indeed, within a
technological community where cumulativeness of invention and a
shared understanding are prominent, there can be a great deal of crosslicensing and cooperation among inventive entities.272
This is not say that there will never be a need for interpretation
whereby the judge will have to make a choice among competing
constructions. There may be more than one underlying assumption
present in a technological community, and how a judge, untrained in the
relevant technology, addresses this disagreement among artisans is an
issue of great importance — and one that is made more difficult as a
result of the so-called “battle of the experts” or, what can be referred
to as “partisan-artisans,” who, armed with powerful Ph.Ds, are more

the patent document — notably the claims themselves — to
ascertain the scope of patent coverage.
This appellate court,
however, should refrain from dictating a claim interpretation
process that excludes reliable expert testimony.
The process of
claim construction at the trial court level will often benefit from
expert testimony which may (1) supply a proper technological
context to understand the claims (words often have meaning o n l y
in context), (2) explain the meaning of claim terms as understood
by one of skill in the art (the ultimate standard for claim meaning)
....
271. See P OSNER, supra note 1, at 37 (“One can expect . . . that polit ical, selfinterested, traditional, habitual, or other truth-independent considerations will play a far
larger role in explaining the content, character, and acceptance of legal ideas than they
play in the case of modern science, where the relevant community agrees on the criteria
for verification.”); see also W ITTGENSTEIN, supra note 42, § 240, at 880 (“Disputes
do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has been
obeyed or not. People don’t come to blows over it, for example. That is part of the
framework on which the working of our language is based . . . .”); Felix Frankfurter,
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes , 47 C OLUM. L. R EV. 527, 528 (1947)
(stating that words “are symbols of meaning. But unlike mathematical symbols, the
phrasing of a document, especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains more than
approximate precision.”).
272. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 178; Scotchmer, supra note 171.
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than willing to share their views in court. There are initially two
responses that, although not solving the problem of ambiguity, add
resolution to the inquiry. First, a judge may appoint a disinterested
expert pursuant to section 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2 7 3 a
special master,274 or engage in other case-management techniques.275
Such an appointment is designed, of course, to ameliorate or avoid the
problems associated with partisan bickering between the litigants’
experts, to inject a certain degree of neutrality into the process, and to
aid the judge in sifting through “truth-independent” assertions. Second,
the patent code276 and the common law offer some resolution as to the
interpretive audience. Recall that claims are written with the artisan of
ordinary skill in mind, not a lay person or even the inventor.277 The
Federal Circuit has endorsed several factors to be considered in
determining level of ordinary skill. 278
In the end, differences within a specific technological community
will exist. These differences in understanding, however, do not mean
that the text and only the text should be consulted for claim meaning.
Rather, my response to this problem is for the Federal Circuit to
exercise obeisance toward the district court and to be more sensitive to
process considerations, including notions of institutional competence.
273. See F ED. R. EVID. 706(a) (“The court may appoint any expert witness agreed
upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.”); see, e.g.,
TM Patents v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(appointing a “disinterested expert and technical advisor”); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lonza,
Inc., 997 F. Supp. 635, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (appointing an independent expert);
Genentech, Inc. v. Boehringer Mannheim GmbH, 989 F.Supp. 359, 365 (D. Mass. 1997)
(appointing a neutral expert to testify how claim language is used by a person of
ordinary skill in the art).
274. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 53(a); see, e.g., Calabrese v. Square D Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d
1050, 1051 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
275. See Breyer, supr a note 262, at 55 (relating that one judge in Alabama recently
appointed a “neutral science panel” of scientists in the silcone gel breast implant
litigation).
276. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112 (1994).
277. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (N.D.
Ill. 1984) (asserting that the “hypothetical person is not the inventor, but an imaginary
being possessing ‘ordinary skill in the art’ created by Congress to provide a standard of
patentability.”).
278. See Env’l Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“(1) the education level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art;
(3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made;
(5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the
field”); see also Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955,
962–63 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[N]ot all such factors may be present in every case, and one
or more of them may predominate.”).
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I pose the following question: Who is better positioned to choose (i.e.,
to interpret) between or among competing background assumptions —
the district court judge or a Federal Circuit judge? It is to this question
that we now turn.
2. Claim Meaning and the Proper Allocation of Interpretive Authority
In his well-known book, Imperfect Alternatives, 279 Professor Neil
Komesar stresses the need to engage in comparative institutional
analysis because the ability of an institution to discharge a given task
cannot be viewed in isolation.280 One of Professor Komesar’s central
insights is the application of public choice theory to legal process
considerations.281 In the context of the adjudicative process, he writes
that a “troubling and important tradeoff between information and
independence . . . is that insulation separates judges from a great deal
of information about the desires and needs of the public.”282 In
contrast, politicians are more accessible, and this access can “provide
them with the most robust and dramatic information on the central
question of desires and needs.”283 At the same time, however, public
choice theory suggests that political access can lead to a “severely
distorted view of public needs.”284 Thus, the “tradeoff is between a
political process that integrates far more information but with a more
significant risk of bias and an adjudicative process that suppresses
information but decreases distortions in its presentation.”285
In the context of claim interpretation, the institutional choice is
whether the district court or the Federal Circuit should be the principal
arbiter. Although in the end the “choice is always” between “imperfect
alternatives,”286 the trial judge is better equipped to make a more
informed decision on claim meaning. Most technological communities

279. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IM P E R F E C T A LTERNATIVES: C HOOSING INSTITUTIONS
ECONOMICS, AND P UBLIC P OLICY (1994).
280. See Edward L. Rubin, Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995
W IS. L. R EV. 463, 464 (reviewing NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
C HOOSING INSTITUTIONS I N L A W , E C O N O M I C S , A N D P U B L I C P O L I C Y (1994))
(“[T]he real question is how a given institution performs in comparison with other
institutions to which that same task might be assigned.”).
281. See id. at 464–65.
282. KOMESAR, supra note 279, at 141.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 5.
IN LAW ,
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have complex constituencies with competing interests in claim
meaning.287 Therefore, the principal arbiter should be independent and
not susceptible (or less susceptible) to the influence of these factional
interests. In addition, background assumptions and industrial custom
play an important role in discerning the meaning of claim language.
Therefore, the principal arbiter must also be flexible and have access to
the relevant technological information. In comparing the institutional
competence of an appellate or a district court judge, both are
sufficiently independent. However, a district court judge, as the finder
of fact, is in a far better position to gather and evaluate factual and
technological information.288
If the district court is the more competent institution to interpret
claim meaning, the logic of deferential appellate review becomes
apparent. Deference is based largely on functional considerations such
as: (1) institutional competence; (2) the temporal dimension of an
infringement analysis, particularly the Doctrine of Equivalents; and (3)
early certainty and uniformity as engendered by application of the
doctrine of issue preclusion.
a. Institutional Competence
It is axiomatic that the trial judge is closer to the action and,
therefore, more intimate with the relevant industry’s background
assumptions than an appellate judge. 289 Thus, deference seems

287. As many scholars have asserted, the inventive entity is no longer a sole
inventor, but rather, an assortment of private firms, universities, and government
agencies.
See, e.g., Rycroft & Kash, Innovation Policy, supra note 28, at 73–79;
R YCROFT & KASH , T HE C OMPLEXITY C HALLENGE, s u p r a note 28; Walter W.
Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the
Biotechnology Industry, 152 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & T HEORETICAL ECON. 97 (1996); Walter W. Powell et al.,
Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning
in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. S CI . Q. 116 (1996).
288. See Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New
Technology, 34 W AKE F OREST L. R EV. 827, 837 (1999) (asserting that “[t]he
mistakes made by the CAFC [i.e., Federal Circuit] stem in large part from institutional
constraints. . . . [including a lack of resources to] expand its decisionmaking capacity
to keep pace with the expansion of technology.”).
289. See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed
From Above, 22 S YR. L. R EV. 635, 663 (1971) (writing that it is not that the trial court
judge “knows more than his loftier brothers; rather, he sees more and senses more”).
Professor Rosenberg goes on to write:
In the dialogue between the appellate judges and the trial judge, the
former often seem to be saying: “You were there. We do not
think we would have done what you did, but we were not present
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particularly appropriate when there are competing assumptions or
customs in a scientific community because the trial judge is
institutionally positioned to examine the extrinsic context, determine
credibility, and then choose (i.e., interpret) between or among the
proffered meanings.290 In a situation where there are competing claim
meanings, a district court judge (particularly when aided by an
independent court-appointed expert), armed with extrinsic evidence, will
more likely than an appellate judge arrive at a meaning of a claim term
that is consistent with the technologic community’s understanding.
The necessity of extrinsic evidence to the district court judge has
led several prominent district court judges to express frustration with
and bewilderment over the Federal Circuit’s de novo standard of review
and its limitations on extrinsic evidence. 291 For example, Judge

and we may be unaware of significant matters, for the record does
not adequately convey to us all that went on at the trial.
Therefore, we defer to you.”
Id.
290. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (stating that an
appellate court should accord deference to the district court “when it appears that the
district court is ‘better positioned’ than the appellate court to decide the issue in
question or that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal
doctrine”); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 (1995) (“[T]he
reviewing attitude that a court of appeals takes toward a district court decision should
depend upon ‘the respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate courts .’”)
(quoting Salve Reg i n a ). In his Cybor dissent, Judge Rader elaborated on the district
court’s institutional advantage:
Trial judges can spend hundreds of hours reading and rereading all
kinds of source material, receiving tutorials on technology from
leading scientists, formally questioning technical experts and
testing their understanding against that of various experts,
examining on site the operation of the principles of the claimed
invention, and deliberating over the meaning of the claim
language. . . .
An appellate court has none of these advantages. It cannot
depart from the record of the trial proceedings.
To properly
marshal its resources, the appellate bench must enforce strict time
and page limits in oral and written presentations. Moreover, a
sterile written record can never convey all the nuances and
intangibles of the decisional process.
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1477–78 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
291. See, e.g., Judge Dee Benson, Resources for Adjudicating Complex Technology
Issues, in 4 GLOBALIZATION O F I NTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY IN THE 21ST C ENTURY
43, 47, 49 (1998). Judge Benson wrote:
[K]eep this in mind about a typical district judge: he or she has
something in the neighborhood of 400 to 700 cases. I have about
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McKelvie of the District Court in Delaware, in a footnote of an opinion
that is worth quoting in full, candidly wrote:
As I understand Markman [I], because claim
construction presents a purely legal question, trial
judges must ignore all non-transcribable courtroom
occurrences . . . .
When two experts testify
differently as to the meaning of a technical term, and
the court embraces the view of one, the other, or
neither while construing a patent claim as a matter of
law, the court has engaged in weighing evidence and
making credibility determinations. If those possessed
of a higher commission wish to rely on a cold written
record and engage in de no v o review of all claim
constructions, that is their privilege. But when the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals states that the trial
court does not do something that the trial court does
and must do to perform the judicial function, the court
knowingly enters the land of sophistry and fiction
. . . . As a consequence, bound by slavish adherence
to the fiction that a judge does not make credibility
determinations when confronted with testimonial
extrinsic evidence en route to pronouncing the “true”
meaning of a patent claim, this opinion has been
crafted in a manner that leaves the reader, and the
reviewing court, uninformed as to the credibility

450 cases presently. About 75 or 80 of those are criminal cases
which demand priority. Of the remaining 300 or 400 or 500 cases,
all of which demand attention, a small percentage involves
intellectual property. I receive more trade dress cases than patent
cases. . . .
. . . I would offer ten quick rules to any practitioner in the United
States. . . .
Number six, I would choose good experts. . . . Not experts
who are patent lawyers and are just an added, concealed ad d i t i o n t o
your legal staff, but some people who can actually help explain
that model or diagram that you’ve placed before the judge. I think
a good teacher in an expert is very important, especially for this
person who will be interpreting as a matter of law, the claims in
the patent involved.
Id. In 1999, less than one percent of all cases commenced in federal district court were
patent cases (2,318 out of 260,271). See Judicial Business of the United States Courts,
Table C-2A, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (1999).
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assessments which, as always, are necessary
precursors to the acceptance or rejection of
testimonial evidence from competing experts. In
fairness to all, those assessments unavoidably have
been made in evaluating all testimony and in
connection with exhibits relating to claim
construction.292
In short, “a careful consideration of the institutional advantages of the
district court would counsel deference.”293
b. The Temporal Dimension of the Doctrine of Equivalents
Any theory of claim interpretation must be sensitive to the common
law Doctrine of Equivalents (“DOE”). In the 1850s and certainly
towards the end of the nineteenth century, there was a push to require
patent applicants to claim their inventions with more particularity.294 But
a call for precision was also an invitation for circumvention, thereby
potentially transforming “the protection of the patent grant into a hollow
and useless thing.”295 The equitable response was the Doctrine of
Equivalents, which allowed a finding of infringement even if the claim

292. Lucas Aerospace Ltd. v. Unison Indus. L.P. , 890 F. Supp. 329, 333 n.7; see also
In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354,
1359 (Easterbrook, J.) (“[J]udges should not pretend that all nominally ‘legal’ issues
may be resolved without reference to facts.”); Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1480 (Newman, J.,
additional views) (“By continuing the fiction that there are no facts to be found in claim
interpretation, we confound rather than ease the litigation process.”).
In another
opinion, Judge McKelvie wrote:
In Markman, the Federal Circuit stated, in no uncertain terms, that
it would have the final say as to the meaning of words in a claim
of a patent, according no deference to decisions by the various
United States District Court Judges. That is, in spite of a trial
judge’s ruling on the meaning of disputed words in a claim, should
a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit disagree, the entire case
could be remanded for retrial on different claims.
Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 857 (D. Del.
1995) (citation omitted).
293. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1478 (Rader, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recognized that there are “circumstances in which Congress or this Court has articulated
a standard of deference for appellate review of district-court determinations [to] reflect
an accommodation of the respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate
courts.” Salve Regina, 499 U.S. at 233.
294. See supra note 50.
295. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1949).
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in issue did not literally read on the accused product.296 In many ways,
the doctrine was a reaction to the inherent limitations of language.
The DOE has come under attack in recent years by
c ommentators297 and the Federal Circuit, particularly the
hypertextualists. Beginning with Judge Lourie’s opinion in London v.
Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 298 the hypertextualists have sought to
eliminate or greatly circumscribe the application of the DOE because the
doctrine, in requiring the judge to look beyond the claim language and
the written text, frustrates the notice function of the patent claim.
The central question under the DOE is: To what extent can a
patentee capture a technological advance that may have been stimulated
or influenced by the patent’s disclosure, yet does not fit literally within
the patent’s claim? This question implies the existence of a postissuance temporal dimension to a DOE analysis. Indeed, as the
Supreme Court recently noted, “the proper time for evaluating
equivalency . . . is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent
was issued.”299 The DOE is applied at the time of infringement because
of the cumulative and unforeseeable nature of complex and ramified
technologies, whereby one inventor opens a door for a subsequent
inventor, a door which was perhaps not foreseeable at the time the first
inventor filed for a patent, yet was eventually made possible because of
the first inventor’s patent disclosure. 300

296. By “read on” I mean that each limitation of the claim at issue is found in the
accused device. See Amhil Enters. Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554, 1562 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“Literal infringement of a claim exists when every limitation recited in the
claim is found in the accused device, i.e., when the properly construed claim reads on the
accused device exactly.”).
297. See, e.g., Paul M. Janicke, Heat of Passion: What Really Happened in Graver
Tank, 24 AM. INTELL. P ROP. L. ASS’ N Q. J. 1, 152 (1996) (“All things considered, it
is time to eliminate [the doctrine of equivalents]. Conceived in fairness, it now does
more mischief than it achieves benefit. The reissue sections of the patent statute should
be amended to allow broadened reissue at any time.”).
298. 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
299. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 19 (1997)
(emphasis added).
300. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 941 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (en banc) (“It is clear that an equivalent can be found in technology known at the
time of the invention, as well as in subsequently developed technology.”).
In
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries, 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), the court stated:
The doctrine of equivalents is necessary because one cannot
predict the future. Due to technological advances, a variant of an
invention may be developed after the patent is granted, and that
vari ant may constitute so insubstantial a change from what is
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It would simply be too burdensome and would unduly limit the
scope of protection to require a patent applicant to disclose every
possible equivalent in the patent application.301 Because equivalents of
the claimed invention are not limited to those disclosed in the patent
document, a judge must not only parse the text of the patent, but must
also determine the technological advance of the alleged infringer and the
extent to which the alleged infringer benefitted from the patentee’s
inventive contribution — a contribution that is not explicitly captured by
the patent’s text.302 In other words, under an equivalency analysis, a
judge must ascertain the inventive contributions of both the patentee and
the alleged infringer. To fully appreciate the patent’s claim scope when
determining equivalents, a judge must look beyond the patent’s text and
substantively examine the extrinsic context of both the patented
invention and the allegedly infringing invention.303 As the Supreme
Court stated in Graver Tank & Manufacturing. Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co.:304
Like any other issue of fact, final determination [of
equivalency] requires a balancing of credibility,
persuasiveness and weight of evidence. It is to be
decided by the trial court and that court’s decision,
under general principles of appellate review, should
not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Particularly
is this so in a field where so much depends upon

claimed in the patent that it should be held to be an infringement.
Such a variant, based on after-developed technology, could not
have been disclosed in the patent.
301. See S.R.I. Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (plurality opinion) (“The law does not require the impossible. Hence, it does
not require that an applicant describe in his specification every conceivable and possible
future embodiment of his invention.”); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“It is not required that those
skilled in the art knew, at the time the patent application was filed, of the asserted
equivalent means of performing the claimed functions.”).
302. Although this approach is reminiscent of Professor Eskridge’s “dynamic
statutory interpretation,” see generally, ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, in claim
interpretation, as opposed to statutory interpretation, a judge is focused on a specific
technological community that shares a common language.
To the extent there are
choices within that community, the judge is nonetheless cabined much more so than he
would be if interpreting a statute.
303. See IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1435 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (asserting that “the context of the invention should be considered when
performing” an equivalence analysis).
304. 399 U.S. 605 (1949).
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familiarity with specific scientific problems and
principles not usually contained in the general
storehouse of knowledge and experience. 305
Hypertextualism, with its emphasis on textual fidelity and de novo
review, may unduly limit the scope of patent protection and, therefore,
have a negative effect on patent law’s incentive dynamic. On the other
hand, the linguistic terrain outside the claim can be slick, and one must
be wary of migratory proprietary boundaries that can lead to
uncertainty. A pragmatic textualist approach to claim interpretation,
with its focus on internal coherence, industry custom and
consequentialism is arguably best suited to balance these competing
considerations. The use of pragmatism is particularly important in this
regard. As Judge Posner, in the context of statutory interpretation,
states:
[Pragmatist] judges use consequences to guide their
decisions, always bearing in mind that the relevant
consequences include systemic ones such as the risk
of debasing the currency of statutory language. . . .
. . . The relevant consequences to the pragmatists are
long run as well as short run, systemic as well as
individual, the importance of stability and predictability
as well as of justice to the individual parties, the
importance of maintaining language as a reliable
method of communication as well as of interpreting
statutes and constitutional provisions flexibly in order
to make them speak intelligently to circumstances not
envisaged by their drafters.306
There is another point that I wish to address, and that is the
interplay between prosecution history estoppel and the application of the
DOE. What I have asserted in this article is that industry custom and
the linguistic practices within an industry are as much a part of the
public record as the patent doc ument, including the latter’s claims,
written description, and prosecution history. However, there are certain
forms of knowledge pertaining to a patent that are simply unknowable
from a third-party competitor’s perspective. For example, although
when a patent applicant amends his claims during the prosecution of the
patent, the reason for the amendment (e.g., to avoid prior art) is
305. Id. at 609–10.
306. P OSNER, supra note 1, at 400–01.
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generally discernable from the prosecution history, there are occasions
when the reason is undiscoverable. In this situation (i.e., when the
reason for the amendment is unknown), the Federal Circuit, in Sextant
Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 307 a hypertextualist opinion,
held that with respect to the amended claim language, the applicant is
barred entirely from utilizing the DOE. 308 In a more recent decision, the
Federal Circuit sitting en banc has gone one step further. In Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 309 the court, in the
name of certainty, held that “when a claim amendment creates
prosecution history estoppel with regard to a claim element, there is no
range of equivalents available for the amended claim element.”310 That
is, even if the reason for the amendment is known, “[a]pplication of the
doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is completely barred.”31 1
These decisions underscore what little emphasis (or faith) the
hypertextualists place on extrinsic context.
I posit that, from a policy perspective, the reason for the existence
of an amendment is irrelevant to whether or not the DOE can be
asserted in the first instance. 312 Rather, an amendment is important only

307. 172 F.3d 817 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Lourie, J.).
308. See id. at 832.
309. 2000 WL 1753646 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
310. Id. at *9.
311. Id.
312. From a doctrinal viewpoint, the Sextant and Festo decisions are on firmer
ground when the reason for the amendment is unknown. The decision was based upon
a plausible reading of the following language in Warner-Jenkinson:
In our view, holding that certain reasons for a claim amendment
may avoid the application of prosecution history estoppel is not
tantamount to holding that the absence of a reason for an
amendment may similarly avoid such an estoppel. Mindful that
claims do indeed serve both a definitional and a notice function, we
think the better rule is to place the burden on the patent holder to
establish the reason for an amendment required during patent
prosecution. The court then would decide whether that reason is
sufficient to overcome prosecution history estoppel as a bar to
application of the doctrine of equivalents to the element added by
that amendment.
Where no explanation is established, however,
the court should presume that the patent applicant had a
substantial reason related to patentability for including the limiting
element added by amendment. In those circumstances, prosecution
history estoppel would bar the application of the doctrine
equivalents as to that element.
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997). But see
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(Newman, J.).
Although the district court characterized the reason for claim
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for purposes of determining the scope of equivalence, if any — that is,
the extent to which the patentee can extend his equivalence claim to
capture allegedly infringing products. Let’s look at a simple
hypothetical:
Inventor originally claims a composition of matter
comprising X and Y. During prosecution, she amends
her claim and substitutes Q for X. The patent issues.
A few years after Inventor’s patent issues, it becomes
known in the industry that with respect to the subject
matter being claimed, Z is equivalent to Q. Competitor
1 begins to make X and Y. Competitor 2 begins to
make Z and Y.
Certainly, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel would prevent
Inventor from recapturing X. Festo, however, would bar Inventor
from asserting infringement under the DOE against Competitor 2 even
though Inventor only surrendered X, not Z. But this should be a scope
issue, not a question of whether DOE can be asserted. In this situation,
Inventor should be allowed to make a DOE claim, but its scope would
not cover X. Given the knowledge in the industry that Z is equivalent
to Q, why shouldn’t Inventor be entitled to assert the DOE against
Competitor 2? For the hypertextualists, surrendering an inch is
equivalent to total surrender.
c. Early Certainty, Uniformity, and Issue Preclusion
The pragmatic textualists on the Federal Circuit have argued that
deference is also appropriate because making it more difficult to reverse
a trial judge’s claim interpretation will most likely lead to greater
certainty earlier in the litigation process and, therefore, induce
settlement negotiations.313 Accordingly, the pragmatic textualists assert

amendment as a “mystery,” the Federal Circuit stated that “a voluntary amendment,
not accompanied by argument or representations relevant to patentability, does not
necessarily generate an estoppel, any more than do the claims as originally filed.” Id.
at 1373–74.
The Federal Circuit has agreed to address en banc the apparent
inconsistency between Sextant and Festo. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (order granting petition to hear en banc).
313. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448. (Rader, J., dissenting).
According to Judge Rader’s dissent:
Markman I potentially promised to supply early certainty about
the meaning of a patent claim. This certainty, in turn, would
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that it is disingenuous to suggest that de novo review of the trial court’s
claim interpretation will lead to certainty and to the “true” meaning of
the claim. Indeed, if anything, characterizing claim interpretation as a
question of law will have the opposite effect.314
In support of de novo review and exclusion of extrinsic evidence,
the hypertextualists cite Justice Souter’s language in Markman II
regarding the need for uniformity in patent law and the Federal Circuit’s
role in promoting uniformity.315 The argument is that in the absence of

prompt early settlement of many, if not most, patent suits. Once
the parties know the meaning of the claims, they can predict with
some reliability the likelihood of a favorable judgment, factor in
the economics of the infringement, and arrive at a settlement to
save the costs of litigation.
Id. at 1475.
314. Judge Rader further noted:
Instead, the current Markman I regime means that the trial court’s
early claim interpretation provides no early certainty at all, but
only opens the bidding. The meaning of a claim is not certain (and
the parties are not prepared to settle) until nearly the last step in
the process — decision by the . . . Federal Circuit. To get a certain
claim interpretation, parties must go past the district court’s
Markman I proceeding, past the entirety of discovery, past the
enti re trial on the merits, past post trial motions, past briefing and
argument to the Federal Circuit — indeed past every step in the
entire course of federal litigation, except Supreme Court review.
In implementation, a de novo review of claim interpretation has
postponed the point of certainty to the end of the litigation
process, at which point, of course, every outcome is certain
anyway.
Id. at 1476; see also Kimberly M. Ruch-Alegant, Note, Markman: In Light of De Novo
Review, Parties to Patent Infringement Litigation Should Consider the ADR Option, 16
T EMP . ENVTL. L. & T ECH . J. 307, 308 (1998) (“De novo review of claim
interpretation by the appellate court has the practical effect of forcing the parties to
completely relitigate the issue of patent infringement on appeal.”)
According to one
practitioner:
[O]ne would expect that shifting the duty of claim construction
from the jury to the judge would result in more instances of proper
claim constructions at the trial court level and thus fewer reversals
by the Federal Circuit. Thus far, however, the Markman decision
has done little to remove the cloud of uncertainty surrounding
claim construction.
Holmes J. Hawkins, III, Claim Interpretation in a Post-Markman Environment, in
P A T E N T L I T I G A T I O N , 681, 683–84 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 572, 1999).
315. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370.
According to
Justice Souter:
[W]hereas issue preclusion could not be asserted against new and
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issue preclusion, the eradication of the jury from claim interpretation
would allow a judge, armed with stare decisis, to construe the claim
language in question once and for all.316 This argument is legitimate, but
it says nothing about the allocation of interpretive authority between the
appellate tribunal and the trial court.317 Indeed, as I will explain below,
there is little reason to doubt that vesting the district court judge with
principal interpretive authority would lead to the type of uniformity
discussed in Markman II. The key to promoting uniformity and
predictability was eliminating the jury from claim interpretation.
Furthermore, we must keep in mind that the creation of the Federal
Circuit was prompted by a post-issuance phenomenon that pertained to
the disparities extant in the adjudication of patent disputes by the
regional circuit courts.318 Prior to the creation of the court, it was not
uncommon for an issued patent to have been declared invalid in one
circuit court, but valid in another.319 Thus, it is no doubt true that the
policies behind the creation of the Federal Circuit were to instill
certainty and uniformity into the patent laws and to prevent forum
shopping by patentees and alleged infringers.320 However, these policy
objectives do not necessarily translate into de novo review and, for all
practical purposes, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence. Certainty and

independent infringement defendants even within a given
jurisdiction, treating interpretive issues as purely legal will promote
(though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty through
the application of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject
to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single
appeals court.
Id. at 391.
316. See id.
317. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1480 (Newman, J., additional views) (asserting that the
Supreme Court’s “affirmation [in Markman II] that claim interpretation ‘is exclusively
within the province of the court’ did not shut out the trial judge with the jury” (citation
omitted)).
318. Before the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, a patent case was appealed
from federal district court to the regional circuit court of appeals.
319. See H.R. R EP . NO. 97-312, at 20–21, 22 (1981) (“[S]ome circuit courts are
regarded as ‘pro-patent’ and others ‘anti-patent,’ and much time and money is expended
in ‘shopping’ for a favorable venue. . . . [Furthermore,] the validity of a patent is too
dependent upon geography (i.e., the accident of judicial venue) to make effective
business planning possible.”).
320. See id. at 22 ( “ A single court of appeals for patent cases will promote certainty
where it is lacking to a significant degree and will reduce, if not eliminate, the forumshopping that now occurs.”); see also S. R EP . NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (“The creation
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this
area of the law. Such uniformity will reduce the forum-shopping that is common to
patent litigation.”).
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uniformity will not be threatened — indeed, they will be enhanced — if
the court were to apply a more deferential standard of review and were
to relax its restrictions on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence. In this
regard, the Federal Circuit’s role in promoting uniformity and certainty
in our patent system is fulfilled simply by its exercising exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. If we accept that the district court judge, because
of his institutional position and all of its concomitant benefits, should be
the principal arbiter of claim meaning, then a deferential standard of
review by a singular appellate court would not diminish the realization
of certainty and uniformity. By simply reviewing the case and reaching
a decision, the Federal Circuit has provided the claim language in
question with a uniform meaning — regardless of the standard of
review.
There is one scenario that is frequently cited by those who support
de novo review. This scenario envisions the same patent claim language
being litigated simultaneously in two district courts. It is plausible in
such a situation that the two district court judges will arrive at dissimilar
claim interpretations based upon their respective understandings of the
extrinsic evidence. A more deferential standard of review, the argument
goes, may lead to affirming two divergent interpretations, particularly
where there is disagreement within the technological community as to
the meaning of the claim language in question.
This scenario, however, overlooks the application of the doctrine
of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel as illustrated by TM Patents
L.P. v. International Business Machines Corp. 321 There, the patentee,
TM Patents, brought a patent infringement suit against IBM in the
Southern District of New York alleging that IBM infringed TM’s ’979,
’342, and ’773 patents.322 Judge McMahon held a Markman hearing323
to construe the relevant claim language in the three patents. A few
years before the New York litigation, however, TM had sued EMC
Corporation in a separate patent infringement proceeding in the District

321. 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see al s o Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 110
F. Supp. 2d 667, 669–73 (N.D.Ill. 2000) (following TM Patents v. IBM). But see Graco
Children’s Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int’l, LLC, 77 F. Supp 2d. 660, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(declining to follow TM Patents v. IBM). For a discussion comparing TM Patents v.
IBM and Graco, see Craig A. Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and
Mantras, 2001 ILL. L. R EV. (forthcoming 2001).
322. See TM Patents v. IBM, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
323. A Markman hearing is a proceeding whereby the district court judge hears
evidence on claim construction, and, thereafter, construes the claims in issue before a
trial on the merits commences. See, e.g., id. at 375.
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Court of Massachusetts.324 In the Massachusetts case, Judge William
Young had also held a Markman hearing and had construed some of the
same claim language of the ‘342 patent that TM was asserting in the
New York litigation.325 As a result, IBM argued that TM was collaterally
estopped from relitigating the claim language that Judge Young had
construed in the Massachusetts litigation.326 Although recognizing that
no case had yet applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar
relitigation of claim construction, Judge McMahon agreed with IBM,
stating that application of collateral estoppel “seems self-evident.”327
Judge McMahon began her analysis by reciting the four elements328
that must be met for collateral estoppel to apply. Of the four criteria,
the parties agreed that two were satisfied — namely, “the issues raised
in both proceedings must be identical” and “the party to be estopped
must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in that
prior proceeding.”329 The disagreement centered around the “finality”
of the prior judgment.330
TM strenuously asserted that the
Massachusetts claim construction was not preclusive because the case
settled during trial and Judge Young’s “rulings were not sufficiently
‘final.’”331 Judge McMahon was not persuaded:
Unfortunately for TM, that is not the law of this
Circuit (or any other, for that matter). Since Judge
Friendly’s seminal opinion in Lummus Co. v.
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., it has been settled that a
judgment that is not “final” in the sense of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 can nonetheless be considered “final” in the
sense of precluding further litigation of issues that

324. See TM Patents L.P. v. EMC Corp., No. 98-10206 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 1999).
325. See id.
326. See TM Patents v. IBM, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
327. Id. at 376 (“While this raises an issue of first impression, I conclude that Judge
Young’s resolution of the meaning of certain disputed patent terms following a
Markman hearing, at which TM had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the meaning
of those terms, is binding on the Plaintiffs in this action.”).
328. See id. at 375 (The four elements are: (1) the issues raised in both proceedings
must be identical; (2) the relevant issues must have actually been litigated and decided
in the prior proceeding; (3) the party to be estopped must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issues in that prior proceeding; and (4) resolution of the
issues must have been necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits).
329. Id.
330. See id. (Judge McMahon collapsed elements two and four because “in this
particular case, the fourth element (finality) subsumes the second (actually decided).”).
331. Id.
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were actually determined in such a judgment. . . . As
Judge Friendly observed, “‘Finality’ in the context
here relevant may mean little more than that the
litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage
that a court sees no really good reason for permitting
it to be litigated again.”332
What Judge McMahon found particularly persuasive was that “after
Markman, claim construction became a separate legal issue.”333 As
claim construction is a matter solely for the court in the post-Markman
era, parties, much like TM in the Massachusetts and New York
litigations, fully litigate claim meaning prior to trial. 334 Therefore, once
a judge construes the claims at the close of a Markman hearing, “[i]t is
hard to see how much more ‘final’ a determination can be.”335 Judge
McMahon also noted that the Supreme Court, in affirming Markman I,
emphasized the promotion of uniformity in claim meaning.336 For Judge
McMahon,
After Markman, with its requirement that the Court
construe the patent for the jury as a matter of law, it
is inconceivable that a fully-litigated determination
after a first Markman hearing would not be preclusive
in subsequent actions involving the same disputed
claims under the same patent. The nature of the
Markman proceeding is such that finality is its aim.337
332. Id. at 375–76 (citation omitted).
333. Id. at 376.
334. See id.
335. Id.
336. See id. at 377. The Federal Circuit, in Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Independent Living
Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1999), stressed the importance of uniformity and
consistency in claim interpretation so much so that the court permitted a patentee to
invoke what amounted to offensive issue preclusion against a new and independent
defendant based upon an earlier non-precedential Federal Circuit opinion construing the
“same claim of the same patent.” Id. at 1338.
Notably, Federal Circuit Rule 47.6(b)
prohibits litigants from citing as precedent nonprecedential opinions; however, the rule
does not “preclude assertion of issues of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial
estoppel, law of the case or the like based on” a nonprecedential opinion. According
to the court, “the interest of consistency in the construction of patent claims would be
ill served by interpreting Rule 47.6(b) to preclude consideration of a prior claim
construction rendered as a matter of law by this court.” Burke, 183 F.3d at 1337.
337. TM Patents v. IBM, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 377. The finality of a Markman ruling,
according to Judge McMahon, also has implications for interlocutory appeals.
According to Judge McMahon, “[S]o final is a Markman ruling that one could make a
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The point to be made here is that when two or more district court
judges hold a Markman hearing and are willing to invoke collateral
estoppel, the Federal Circuit’s ability to promote uniformity and early
certainty in claim meaning is no greater than that of a district court —
even if the district court judge applying collateral estoppel does not
agree with his fellow judge’s prior construction.338 In fact, de novo

strong case for routinely certifying an interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit . . .
. ” I d . at 377 n.1. However, the Federal Circuit has not been receptive to interlocutory
appeals with respect to claim interpretation. As noted by Judge Newman:
Although the district courts have extended themselves, and socalled “ Markman hearings” are common, this has not been
accompanied by interlocutory review of the trial judge’s claim
interpretation. The Federal Circuit has thus far declined all such
certified questions. . . . [thereby resulting in] two untoward
consequences; first, the district court has had to conduct a perhaps
unnecessary trial; and second, the eventual issuance of a new claim
interpretation by the Federal Circuit, on appeal after final
judgment, has sometimes required a second trial of the issue of
infringement.
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F. 3d 1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J.,
additional views). A third consequence has been for a party, faced with an unfavorable
claim construction, to request that the district court judge enter an adverse judgment
against them thereby prompting an immediate appeal to the Federal Circuit. See, e.g.,
Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 (D. Del. 1999). In Schering,
Judge Schwartz speculated that perhaps the reason the Federal Circuit disfavors
interlocutory revi ew of Markman decisions without a party initially conceding that it
cannot succeed under the district court’s claim interpretation is because of “the parties’
intensity of preference for challenging adverse claim construction decisions.” Id. at 377
n.2. Judge Schwartz continued:
[I]f a party must first consent to a final judgment of
noninfringement, it will only challenge a claim construction
decision when it concludes it cannot prove infringement under the
claim interpretation.
By denying interlocutory appeals, the
Federal Circuit will only hear appeals from adverse claim
construction decisions where the party concludes its case is
irreparably harmed by the lower court’s claim interpretation.
Id. However, the losing party on claim interpretation will most likely appeal after final
judgment anyway — when district court and party resources have been expended,
knowing full well that de novo review awaits. Law of the case will preclude a party
losing after trial from appealing an interlocutory appeal that was accepted and decided
by the Federal Circuit. Thereby significant judicial resources may be conserved, and the
parties may be induced to settle before trial.
338. See TM Patents v. IBM, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 379 (“I agree with just about
everything Judge Young did when he construed the claims in the EMC action.
Nonetheless, I have no doubt that collateral estoppel would apply against TM on the
previously litigated claims even if I thought everything Judge Young decided was
wrong.”).
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review delays certainty, wastes trial court resources, and leads to costly
appeals. Ironically, from a hypertextualist’s vantage point, the
characterization of claim construction as a question of law renders the
determination a separate legal issue susceptible to collateral estoppel,
thus enhancing the power of the district court judge. 339
The application of collateral estoppel is also consistent with
Markman II. Recall Justice Souter’s language that “principles of issue
preclusion . . . ordinarily foster uniformity.”340 Thus, the Supreme
Court envisioned that the Federal Circuit would promote uniformity in
claim construction when collateral estoppel is unavailable — i.e.,
where a plaintiff, who received a favorable claim construction in a prior
litigation, now brings an infringement suit against a new and
independent defendant in a subsequent litigation.341 Thus, under my
proposal, in the event the subsequent district court were to reach a
different claim construction than the prior district court, it would be
appropriate, in the name of uniformity, for the Federal Circuit to step in
and choose which of the two interpretations should prevail. However,
this exception is welcome not because the court is more competent to
arrive at the “true” and “objective” meaning of the claim or because of
some exaggerated notion of the notice function of patent claims; rather,
it reflects a situation where the Federal Circuit is institutionally
positioned to promote uniformity as the appellate patent court.

339. The argument throughout this article has been that de novo review and the
exclusion of extrinsic evidence is improper when the issue before the court is claim
meaning. I noted at the beginning of this Article that how courts interpret the patent
code is a subject worthy of exploration.
Although that exploration must wait for
another day, it is worth noting here that in matters of statutory interpretation that do
not relate directly to claim interpretation, de novo review is appropriate, and the
Federal Circuit does play a significant role in promoting uniformity and predictability.
Statutes and claims are similar to a certain extent, but there are also important
differences that suggest that with respect to statutes, the Federal Circuit should have
principal interpretive authority. First, in interpreting statutes, the judge is the person
of ordinary skill in the art. Second, the judge should understand how his interpretation
affects industry. In his capacity, the Federal Circuit judge is better suited than the
district judge. The Federal Circuit judge is exposed to the patent code more frequently,
and therefore has developed a greater intimacy with the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. (1994),
and its role in research and development practices.
340. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).
341. See supra note 312.
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Choosing a Construction in the Face of Persistent Ambiguity:
Canons of Claim Construction as Default Rules

Having concluded that the district court judge is better suited than
his appellate colleagues to discern claim meaning and address ambiguity,
the question becomes: How should a judge, faced with persistent
ambiguity, choose between or among competing claim constructions?
By “persistent” I mean that after consideration of the intrinsic and
extrinsic evidence, the judge and his independent expert conclude that
the claim language in question remains ambiguous.
One answer to this question is for the judge to apply canons of
claim construction as a type of default rule. 342 Indeed, there is a need
for canons in claim interpretation, but their application should be limited
to situations where the district court judge, after considering both the
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, determines that the claim is ambiguous.
Importantly, the judge should determine exactly what type of ambiguity
exists because the applicable canon will depend on the type of
ambiguity.
If the claim is ambiguous in that it is subject to at least two
reasonable constructions, the judge may be well-advised to invoke the
doctrine of contra proferentem. This canon of construction posits that
the court should adopt the construction that is less favorable to the
party that drafted the language. 343 This approach was adopted by the
Federal Circuit in Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Manufacturing,
Inc.,344 wherein the court, faced with claim language that was
susceptible of two reasonable constructions, stated:
Where there is an equal choice between a broader and
a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is an
enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is
at least entitled to a claim having the narrower
meaning, . . . [the] notice function of the

342. The courts throughout the years have formulated several canons of claim
construction.
See DONALD S. C H I S U M , C H ISUM ON P ATENTS § 18.03[2] (2000)
(discussing canons of claim construction).
For purposes of this article, I am only
interested in those canons that are invoked when the claim is deemed ambiguous.
343. For a discussion of the canon of contra proferentem in the context of
government contract litigation, see C. Stanley Dees & David A. Churchill, Government
Contract Cases in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: 1996 in
Review, 6 AM. U. L. R EV. 1807, 1847 (1997).
344. 73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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claim . . . [is] best served by adopting the narrower
meaning.345
Although it invoked the canon of contra proferentem, the court did not
label it as such.3 4 6 The application of contra proferentem is also
consistent with the canon of claim construction that states that “[w]hen
claims are amenable to more than one construction, they should when
reasonably possible be interpreted so as to preserve their validity.”347
Another option for a court confronted with claim ambiguity is to
invalidate the claim for indefiniteness (i.e., the claim does not inform a
person skilled in the art of the scope of the claim) under 35 U.S.C. §
112, ¶ 2.348 This option is consistent with the notice function of the
patent claim and, for that reason, was preferred by Judge Nies in
Athletic Alternatives. 349 However, invalidation should arguably be
confined to claim language that is approaching unintelligibility. In this
situation, the judge, arms thrown in the air, is saying, “I don’t even have
a choice between a narrower and broader construction.”
Therefore, depending on the type of ambiguity present, the judge
will have the option of either choosing the narrower construction or
invalidating the claim. No matter the choice, the result is a sanction
against the patentee, and, hopefully, a deterrent against poor claim
drafting.

345. Id. at 1581.
346. I criticized the court in Athletic Alternatives earlier in this article because
extrinsic evidence was not considered prior to a finding of ambiguity.
Nonetheless,
assuming extrinsic evidence was considered and the court still found the claim ambiguous,
application of contra proferentem would be proper.
347. Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1996). Of course, opting for the narrowing interpretation, while preserving the validity
of the patent, may ultimately lead to a finding of noninfringement.
348. See, e.g., Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1470 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (holding patent claims invalid for indefiniteness); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1217–18 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (same).
349. In her concurring opinion, Judge Nies asserted the following:
I do not agree that the adoption of the narrower of two equally
plausible interpretations somehow flows from the requirement of
section 112 ¶ 2 that the patentee must particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter which he regards as h i s
invention. The majority analysis is illogical to me. Narrowness
can not be equated with definiteness.
73 F.3d 1573, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is a significant movement afoot at the Federal Circuit with
respect to the proper treatment of extrinsic evidence. While what I
have characterized as pragmatic textualism is gradually asserting itself
within the confines of the court, hypertextualism remains the
predominant interpretive approach to claim interpretation. I have argued
that this overly formalistic and acontextual approach is misguided and
self-contradictory. It proclaims to read claim language as a person of
ordinary skill in the art would but, at the same time, eschews the use of
extrinsic evidence, thus distancing itself from the very industry its
ultimate interpretation will most directly affect. Hypertextualism’s de
novo review leads to uncertainty or, at best, dilatory certainty that
impedes settlement negotiations and frustrates business planning. Most
importantly, however, hypertextualism’s disregard for the technological
understanding of the private sector may very well adversely affect
patent law’s delicate incentive structure. Specifically, if courts
substitute their own understanding of a claim for that of the
technological community, the incentives to improve or design around
a claim will evaporate because the claim itself does not have commonly
understood boundaries.
Pragmatic textualism, on the other hand, is consistent with the
patent code and contemporary legal and hermeneutic philosophy. The
pragmatic textualist judge not only understands the importance of
textual fidelity, but he also embraces technologic context and is
sensitive to process considerations such as institutional competence.
In short, the pragmatic textualist judge is self-aware, empirically
inclined, and willing to look beyond the four corners of the patent text.

